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ABSTRACT
For generations, Pierson v. Post, the famous fox case, has
introduced students to the study of property law. Two hundred years
after the case was decided, this Article examines the history of the case
to show both how it fits into the American ideology of property, and
how the facts behind the dispute challenge that ideology. Pierson is a
canonical case because it replicates a central myth of American
property law: that we start with a world in which no one has rights to
anything, and the fundamental problem is how best to convert it to
absolute individual ownership. The history behind the dispute,
however, suggests that the heart of the conflict was a contest over
which community would control the shared resources of the town and
how those resources would be used.
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The historical record is far from complete, but this is what it
shows. Pierson was among the “proprietors,” those who had inherited
from the town’s original settlers special rights in the undivided lands
where the fox was caught. The fox hunt occurred in the midst of a
growing dispute over whether the proprietors or the town residents as
a whole had rights in these common lands. Although Post does not
appear to have had proprietors’ rights, his father had become wealthy
in the West India trade after the Revolutionary War, and his family
flaunted this wealth from commerce. Post’s elaborate fox hunt over
the commons would have been perceived as another display of
conspicuous wealth, inimical to the town’s agricultural traditions. The
Piersons, in contrast, descended from a long line of educated
gentleman farmers and town leaders, and would have followed the
town’s traditions of puritan thrift. Pierson and Post’s conflict over the
fox, I believe, was not really about the fox, but was instead part of this
growing conflict over who could regulate and use the common
resources of the town, and over whether agricultural traditions or
commerce and wealth would define its social organization.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a first year law student eager for initiation to the
mystery and power, the nobility and heartbreak, of the law. You open
your casebook to read your first assignment in property law and
find . . . a centuries old dispute about a fox.1 The story, in short, is that
Lodowick Post is out with his horses and hounds chasing a fox “upon
a certain wild and uninhabited, unpossessed and waste land, called

1.

Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
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2
the beach,” Jesse Pierson jumps up out of nowhere and grabs the fox,
and Lodowick is so upset that he litigates his right to the fox all the
way to the New York Supreme Court.3 You sadly go to class, realizing
4
that law school won’t be quite as you imagined it.
Two hundred years after Pierson v. Post was decided, the case
continues to horrify successive generations of law students with the
thought that success in law school means understanding debates
among nineteenth century judges regarding the relevance of sixth
5
century treatises about the ownership of a dead fox. Scholars cite it
to illustrate everything from discrimination against transgendered
persons6 to rights in fugitive homerun balls.7 Outside the ivory tower,

2. Id. at 175. This “unpossessed and waste land” was Southampton, today some of the
most valuable real estate in the country.
3. Id. Although the New York Supreme Court today is the trial level court in New York,
at the time the Supreme Court of Judicature was the primary appeals court in New York State.
See Jill P. Butler et al., The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York: An Empirical
Study of its Powers and Functions as an Intermediate State Court, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 929,
932–33 (1979). The ultimate court of appeal was the Court of Impeachment and Correction of
Errors, whose members included the members of the Supreme Court, the chancellor, and the
members of the New York Senate. Id. at 933 n.20. Likely because of this odd composition, the
Court of Impeachment seems to have been less important than the Supreme Court during this
early period.
4. Of course this experience is not unique to property law. The vast constitutional
exegesis on the failure to deliver commissions to justices of the peace that is Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), the bewildering dispute over personal jurisdiction that is
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), and the dazzling emergence of proximate cause from a box
of dropped fireworks that is Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), form
similar rites of passage for the new law student. See, e.g., Linda Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner:
The End of An Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 33–34 (1978) (recounting how a homeless man
convinced a civil procedure professor that he was once a law student by correctly reciting the
facts of Pennoyer v. Neff).
5. To illustrate the point: my first presentation of this piece, to a group of junior faculty,
began and ended with confessions that the case elicited their suppressed memories of the horror
of property law.
6. Richard F. Storrow, Gender Typing in Stereo: The Transgender Dilemma in
Employment Discrimination, 55 ME. L. REV. 117, 133 (2003) (citing Pierson as an example of
the tension between clear cut rules and flexible standards faced by students arguing a case in the
face of a precedent denying Title VII action to transgendered persons).
7. See Paul Finkelman, Fugitive Baseballs and Abandoned Property: Who Owns the
Homerun Ball?, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1609, 1629–31 (2002) (analogizing the question of the
ownership of a baseball to that of a wild animal); Michael Pastrick, When a Day at the Park
Turns a “Can of Corn” into a Can of Worms: Popov v. Hayashi, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 905, 920–27
(2003) (same).
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courts and lawyers use it to argue for contested forms of property
8
9
from groundwater aquifers to the America’s Cup trophy.
But no one really knows why there was such a fight about a fox.
Some books, looking to the allegedly Dutch origins of the name
10
“Lodowick” suggest that the dispute was rooted in hostilities
11
between those with English and those with Dutch ancestry. James
Truslow Adams, in his 1962 Memorials of Old Bridgehampton,
explains it away with the Bridgehampton community’s “love of
lawsuits.”12 Most readers likely assume something similar, taking the
case as simply more evidence of the overly litigious nature of the
American public, ignoring the reality that litigation is a rare response
13
to disputes and one that has radically declined since the early days of
the American colonies.14
This Article presents the most complete history yet published of
15
the case. Given the paucity of the documentary record, this story lies
8. City of San Marcos v. Tex. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, 128 S.W.3d 264, 270 (Tex. App.
2004) (citing Pierson to support ownership rights in water to the first person to drill a well and
capture the water).
9. Mercury Bay Boating Club, Inc. v. San Diego Yacht Club, 545 N.Y.S.2d 693, 704 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1989) (Rubin, J., concurring) (citing Pierson for the proposition that violation of the
customs of the chase does not give rise to a legal claim).
10. In fact the name appears to be as likely Scottish or English, the nationalities of most of
the original Southampton settlers, as Dutch. See LORI COOPER, 75,000+ BABY NAMES FOR THE
21ST CENTURY (2001) (listing “Ludwyck” as the Dutch spelling and Lodowick as a Scottish
spelling).
11. See A. JAMES CASNER & W. BARTON LEACH, CASES ON PROPERTY 6 (rev. temp. ed.
1948) (calling the dispute a “petty squabble between country squires—the stubborn affronted
Dutchman and the English-descended violator of the fox-hunter’s code”); CHARLES DONAHUE,
JR., THOMAS E. KAUPER & PETER W. MARTIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION 7 (3d ed. 1993) (asking whether it is
relevant to the dispute that the Piersons were among the first settlers and were probably English
and the Posts seemed to have come later and were probably Dutch).
12. JAMES TRUSLOW ADAMS, MEMORIALS OF OLD BRIDGEHAMPTON 166 (1962).
13. Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Don’t Know (and Think
We Know) About Our Allegedly Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 41 (1983). Galanter
describes this mistaken belief as the “hyperlexis” of the American people. Id. at 6.
14. Id. at 41 (noting that studies of litigation rates in the colonies reveal one county in
which 11 percent of the adult males had appeared in litigation in the past year, another in which
the 24 percent of the population was involved in litigation in a one year period, and a third in
which 11 percent of the adult male population had been involved in litigation five or more times
over a seven year period); see also William Pelletreau, Introduction to 1 RECORDS OF THE
TOWN OF SOUTHAMPTON WITH OTHER ANCIENT DOCUMENTS OF HISTORIC VALUE, at i, ii
(William S. Pelletreau ed., 1874) [hereinafter TOWN RECORDS] (noting that in colonial
Southampton “petty law suits were far more frequent than at present”).
15. Almost every historical account of the case appears to come from the article written by
prolific local historian Judge Henry Hedges in 1895. H. P. Hedges, Pierson v. Post, SAG
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in linking together tantalizing clues rather than in flourishing the
smoking gun. Although I offer my conclusions tentatively, these clues
suggest that the core dispute wasn’t really about the fox at all. Nor
was it about the petty battles between stubborn neighbors in
Southampton, or even about Lodowick’s unfortunate first name.
Instead it was about conflicts over land use and control of this Long
Island community in the face of the rapid changes occurring in the
decades after the Revolutionary War.
The case was decided as a contest between individuals over a
wild animal caught on an “unpossessed and waste land,” and has
served as an initiation ritual for law students for almost a century
because of a particularly American understanding of property law. As
16
the economist on his desert island assumes a can opener, the
classical theorist of property law assumes an original state in which no
one has a superior right to anything. This tradition traces its origins at
least to John Locke, whose influential chapter “Of Property” in his
Second Treatise of Civil Government states, “in the beginning all the
world was America,”17 and explains why this state of common
ownership fails to serve human interests.18 Starting from these
assumptions, the important question becomes what is the best rule for
HARBOR EXPRESS, Oct. 3, 1895. Hedges’ account made it into the text of casebooks after it was
excerpted in JAMES TRUSLOW ADAMS, MEMORIALS OF OLD BRIDGEHAMPTON 166 (1962). A
2002 article, however, discusses the historical status of fox hunting as part of a new economic
analysis of the case. Dhammika Dharmapala & Rohan Pitchford, An Economic Analysis of
“Riding to the Hounds”: Pierson v. Post Revisited, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 39 (2002). Professor
Andrea McDowell is also working on an analysis of the rules of fox hunting as misunderstood
by the judges in Pierson v. Post, see Andrea McDowell, Legal Fictions in Pierson v. Post, 105
MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming Feb. 2007) (on file with the Duke Law Journal), while Professor
Angela Fernandez provides a more detailed history and theory of the manipulation of the case
in the New York Supreme Court, see Angela Fernandez, Legal Archaeology as an Antidote to
the Case Method’s Air of Unreality: A Pedagogical Theory of Pierson v. Post (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
16. For those who don’t know the joke: A physicist, an engineer, and an economist are
stranded on a desert island, with no tools except a box of matches and nothing to eat but some
cans of beans that washed ashore with them.
“I know what to do,” says the physicist. “I’ll light a fire underneath the beans, which
will raise the temperature beyond the boiling point, exploding the can and yielding its
contents!”
“Brilliant!” says the engineer. “I’ll take some palm leaves and bamboo and create a
device to capture the beans as they hurtle from the exploding can.”
“No, no, you’ve got it all wrong,” says the economist. “First, assume a can
opener . . . .”
17. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 121 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ.
Press 2003) (1690).
18. Id. at 111–21.
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converting unowned resources into individual property. Within this
scheme, it is easy to see why Pierson v. Post became and remains a
canonical case in the study of property law. Pierson is about Locke’s
America—the dispute concerns a wild fox (clearly no property rights
in him) on wild land (in which there is an equal absence of rights),
and is about which of two individuals has done the right thing to claim
individual property rights in the fox.
The reality of the case sheds light on how this common
understanding of property law falls short. Recent scholarship has
noted the significant role of shared rights over property law, and has
challenged both the descriptive and normative value of understanding
property as a division between no rights and absolute individual
19
rights. My account of Pierson v. Post and the Long Island
community that generated the case contributes to this scholarship by
suggesting that not only was there never an “America” as Locke
pictured it, but also that property disputes are often about community
control of shared resources rather than individual control of private
resources. In Southampton, community rights to lands might be
simultaneously claimed by the colonial settlers, the English crown,
the Dutch government, the Shinnecock tribe, the Pequot and
Narragansett tribes, the original settlers, the later town residents, and
19. See generally JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 142–52 (1988)
(distinguishing between open access rights and rights shared by closed communities in the
context of lobstering areas shared and enforced by “lobster gangs”); Kristen A. Carpenter, A
Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases: Asserting a Place for Indians as Nonowners, 52
UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1085–92, 1138–39 (2005) (discussing property rights for tribes in sacred
places on land owned by the federal government); Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The
Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549 (2001) (discussing difficulties arising from the overly
individualistic orientation of American property law and developing a theory of a sustainable
closed-property commons which permits exit); Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle:
Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986) (arguing
that in Shasta County, disputes over the use of property are resolved by relations among
neighbors enforcing community norms); Carol M. Rose, Property in All the Wrong Places?, 114
YALE L.J. 991 (2005) (reviewing MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? (2003)
and KAREN R. MERRILL, PUBLIC LANDS AND POLITICAL MEANING (2002)) (challenging an
anthropologist writing about native culture and an historian writing about land use in the West
who each attack property rights based on the assumption that they are all about individual
absolute rights); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986) [hereinafter Rose, The Comedy of the Commons]
(showing the persistence and efficiency of shared property arrangements in American law);
Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to
Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975 (showing that property rights are not absolute but define
continuing relations among people); Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV.
277 (1998) (showing that the continuing American rhetoric and practice of property law
includes the concept of community property rights).
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the State of New York. The dispute between the Piersons and the
Posts, I argue, was part of this conflict, and was motivated by a
dispute over who had the right to use the common lands of the
community, and whether those lands would be used for the leisure
activities of the wealthy or to support the agricultural pursuits of the
town’s original settlers.
Recognizing the importance of this conflict between communities
for rights in property does not settle the question of who should have
won the case. In fact, it only complicates the search for appropriate
property rules in other contexts. But by providing a fuller picture of
property disputes and the rules that emerge from them, it may help to
illuminate what is important in those disputes, and what rules may
better serve our needs.
Part I discusses the role of Pierson v. Post both in the American
ideology of property law and in property casebooks. Part II discusses
the history of conflicts over community control in Southampton, and
the way those conflicts were expressed in disputes over use and
regulation of property. Part III discusses the parties to the case, and
how the dispute over the fox would have fit into the contemporary
struggle over land use and economic and social organization in
Southampton. Part IV discusses the litigation of the case, and the way
the histories of the justices and the transformation of American law
are reflected in the decision. In conclusion, I discuss the continuing
relevance of the case to the understanding and teaching of property
law.
I. THE ROLE OF PIERSON V. POST IN
AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROPERTY LAW
In 1915, when the professors of Harvard Law School decided to
write a new series of casebooks as part of a reform of its first-year
courses, Professor Edward Warren placed Pierson first in his revised
property casebook.20 By 1948, James Casner and W. Barton Leach
said of Pierson’s “wily quadruped21:”“[f]or more than a half century
law students have teethed upon this particular mammal. He is to the

20. EDWARD H. WARREN, SELECT CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON THE LAW OF
PROPERTY (1915). Warren, known as “Bull” Warren for his manner in questioning students,
was one of the models for Professor Kingsfield in The Paper Chase. Byron D. Cooper, The
Integration of Theory, Doctrine, and Practice in Legal Education, 1 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING
DIRS. 50, 55 n.26 (2002).
21. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 180 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (Livingston, J., dissenting).
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law of property what ‘Omnis Gallia’ is to Latin; it is conceivable that
a student might start somewhere else, but it would hardly seem
22
right.” Although property casebooks have multiplied since then, in
most, including the best-selling book by Jesse Dukemenier and James
Krier, Pierson v. Post is still one of the first cases students will
encounter.23
This primacy in legal education is not reflected in legal practice.
Although Pierson is cited among other cases regarding wild animals
in property treatises, this subject makes up only a few pages in multivolume compendiums that largely concern rights in land. And
although one can apply Pierson’s rule of capture to disputes over
water, oil, and other fugitive resources, the resolution of such disputes
owes more to the complex bodies of law specific to those fields. Why,
then, have law schools spent a century training young lawyers how to
resolve disputes about wild foxes?
The answer lies in a distinct vision of property law and its role in
the American polis. The American ideology of property, along with
the American ideology of liberty, was heavily influenced by John
Locke’s 1690 Second Treatise of Government.24 Writing against
assertions of royal control over property, Locke posited an original
state in which all had equal initial rights to resources, and therefore
equal rights to appropriate portions of those resources to
25
themselves. For him and for the Scottish Enlightenment scholars
that followed, individual ownership of property was not only the
foundation for individual liberty, but also the inevitable result of
human progress.26 In what has become a celebrated tradition in
22.
23.

CASNER & LEACH, supra note 11, at 2.
See, e.g., A. JAMES CASNER, W. BARTON LEACH, SUSAN FLETCHER FRENCH, GERALD
KORNGOLD & LEA VANDERVELDE, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 34 (5th ed. 2004)
(placing Pierson fourth after three cases on the right to exclude); CHARLES DONAHUE,
THOMAS KAUPER & PETER MARTIN, PROPERTY 1 (1993) (placing Pierson first); JESSE
DUKEMENIER & JAMES KRIER, PROPERTY 19 (5th ed. 2002) (placing Pierson second after
Johnson v. M’Intosh); JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 94
(1998) (placing Pierson third in the second chapter after the first chapter presents several
theoretical perspectives); SHELDON F. KURTZ & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW 8 (2d ed. 1993) (placing Pierson first after an
article on the concept of individual and shared rights in property); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER,
PROPERTY LAW 78 (3d ed. 2002) (placing Pierson eighth).
24. Thomas P. Peardon, Introduction to JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT, at vii, xix–xx (Thomas P. Peardon ed., The Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1975) (1690).
25. LOCKE, supra note 17, at 111.
26. Id. at 111–21 (alleging that initially all property was held in common, but that as the
population multiplied it was necessary to divide it into individual lots, which in turn led to
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27
property theory, Locke and his successors theorized an evolutionary
development from common property, which was inefficient and
unsuitable to concentrated populations, to individual ownership and
28
management of land and its products.
William Blackstone, whose Commentaries on the Laws of
England were America’s central legal text for the decades after the
29
American Revolution, not only continued this tradition, but also
made it the basis of positive law. Blackstone began his volume on
property with a Lockean evolutionary and biblical story of individual
property ownership. He concluded this story, however, by tying it to
the blessing of English law: “[T]hus the legislature of England has
universally promoted the grand ends of civil society, the peace and
security of individuals, by steadily pursuing that wise and orderly
maxim, of assigning to every thing capable of ownership a legal and
determinate owner.”30
Blackstone intended his Commentaries to showcase the
animating genius of the English common law as one of individual
31
political liberty. But for the Americans, the Commentaries became
yet another confirmation of American uniqueness and superiority.32
In translating these English ideas to their young nation, the founders
saw America as the first site in which Blackstonian ideals could be
realized.33 For the new Americans, Locke’s imagined world of ample,
unpossessed territory would finally permit all to obtain and hold land.
Whatever their ideological bent, the founders believed that individual
property ownership would create the conditions for the world’s first

greater wealth and prosperity); see GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY 61–
62 (1997) (discussing property theories of eighteenth century Scottish Enlightenment
philosophers).
27. This approach gained new life in the modern study of property law through the work of
Harold Demsetz. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
347 (1967).
28. See LOCKE, supra note 17, at 114–18.
29. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *2–6; ALEXANDER, supra note 26, at 47–48
(discussing the influence of Blackstone).
30. BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *15.
31. Stanley L. Katz, Introduction to WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND, A FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION OF 1765–1769, at iii, v (Univ. Chi.
Press 1979).
32. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 26, at 48–49 (describing how John Adams’s
Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law used Blackstone’s arguments to define the American
experience as “the point in time toward which all other moments aimed but never reached”).
33. Id.
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true democracy. For the Jeffersonians, working one’s own plot of land
would generate the civic virtue necessary to maintain a republican
34
democracy. The federalists, for their part, emphasized that
individual ownership of land would provide the means to assert
35
individual will, free from dependence on an overweening state.
The link between individual property ownership and democracy
and virtue was not confined to constitutional philosophers. The
preservation of individual dominion over property became an object
of the public faith. Alexis de Tocqueville, for example, remarked that
“[i]n no country in the world is the love of property more active and
more anxious than in the United States; nowhere does the majority
display less inclination for those principles which threaten to alter, in
36
whatever manner, the laws of property.”
Reverence for individual control of property has persisted
throughout the various permutations of property theory. For
Chancellor James Kent, whose Commentaries on American Law was
the most influential American legal text of the mid-nineteenth
century, individual property provided the means to achieve freedom
37
through participation in the market economy. For John Chipman
Gray, famous advocate of the Rule Against Perpetuities, liberty
meant guarding property against a freedom-sapping paternalism,
private or public.38 For law and economics scholars in the wake of
39
40
Coase and Demsetz, individual property ownership reduces
transaction costs and promotes placement of resources in the hands of
those that value them most, thus ensuring sage use and conservation

34. Id. at 31–32.
35. See id. at 68, 80–82 (discussing federalist perspectives on the connection between
property and liberty).
36. 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 256 (Knopf ed. 1946) (1835).
37. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 265–67 (John M. Gould ed.,
Little, Brown & Co. 1896) (1827). See Fernandez, supra note 15, for an argument that Kent
heavily engineered the Pierson decision.
38. ALEXANDER, supra note 26, at 285–302.
39. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (arguing that in
a world without transaction costs, parties injured by each others’ use of property would bargain
to reach the most cost effective result). This article continues to be the “runaway citation
champion” in legal scholarship, having been cited almost twice as much as any other article.
Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751, 759
(1996).
40. Demsetz, supra note 27, at 348 (“A primary function of property rights is . . . to achieve
a greater internalization of externalities.”).
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41
of property. And all of these themes—freedom, democracy, and
efficiency—permeate the rhetoric of the modern property rights
movement.42
Of course this vision of universal and absolute ownership of
individual property was always more of an ideal than a reality.
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, vast
segments of the population—married women,43 African Americans,44
disfavored immigrants like the Japanese45—were largely excluded
from property ownership. Market processes, combined with economic
upheavals, resulted in a large landless white population and the
concentration of property rights in the hands of a few individuals or
46
entities. Common rights in property have also been a persistent
theme throughout American property law.47 Even where there was

41. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 28–29 (2d ed. 1977).
42. See, e.g., J. David Breemer, O Madison, Where Art Thou?, THE AM. SPECTATOR, June
29, 2005, http://www.spectator.org/dsp_article.asp?art_id=8369# (“[A]ll personal liberties
depend on security in property.”); Citizens for Constitutional Local Government,
http://pvtgov.org/pvtgov (last visited Mar. 13, 2006) (observing that homeowners in a
homeowners’ association surrender “their civil rights without any information that this was
indeed what they had agreed to”); Homeowners Associations: A Nightmare, Not An American
Dream, http://www.ccfj.net/HOANCpets.html (Mar. 13, 2002) (“You surrender your Civil
Liberties when entering a common interest property, and who was to know!”); Mountain States
Legal Foundation, http://www.mountainstateslegal.org (last visited Mar. 13, 2006) (describing
the organization as “a nonprofit, public interest law firm dedicated to individual liberty” and
“the right to own and use property”).
43. ALEXANDER, supra note 26, at 5; Jill Elaine Hasday, The Cannon of Family Law, 57
STAN. L. REV. 825, 842–48 (2004) (describing coverture laws and the exaggerated reports of
their demise).
44. ALEXANDER, supra note 26, at 5; see also Hinds v. Brazealle, 3 Miss. (2 Howard) 837
(1838) (invalidating a will leaving property to testator’s son on grounds that the son was a slave,
the contract emancipating him was invalid, and a slave could not take property).
45. See Keith Aoki, No Right to Own? The Early Twentieth-Century “Alien Land Laws” as
a Prelude to Internment, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 37, 57–59 (1998) (discussing laws barring
“aliens ineligible to citizenship” from owning land as an effort to curb land ownership by
Japanese farmers). Although these alien land laws were specifically directed at Asian
immigrants, common law and statutory disqualifications of all non-citizens from property
ownership existed throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century and continue to a limited
extent even today. See Polly J. Price, Alien Land Restrictions in the Nineteenth Century:
Exploring the Relative Autonomy Paradigm, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 152, 152–53 (1999).
46. This process was already occurring in the revolutionary era, resulting in divisions
between rights of persons and of property. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1777, at 503–04 (1998) (discussing division and quoting Madison as
saying that, “[i]n future times . . . a great majority of the people will not only be without landed,
but any other sort of, property”).
47. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 19, at 713. Joan Williams, moreover,
notes that in the area of covenants American property law has recognized more group
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individual ownership, as Blackstone’s Commentaries themselves
48
show, it never meant absolute dominion. Rather, as exemplified by
doctrines such as nuisance, eminent domain, and adverse possession,
the individual’s dominion over property was always limited by
correlative rights, privileges, and duties in other individuals and
groups.49 And the choice of whose rights and privileges the state
would enforce has always had as much to do with which communities’
interests were to be protected as with who had the abstract right to
the property.50
But like Blackstone, who called property a realm of “sole and
despotic dominion” before launching into the web of shared
“incorporeal hereditaments,”51 the modern study of property law
starts with Pierson v. Post before entering the world of landlordtenant, nuisance, and homeowners’ associations. It thereby minimizes
these shared rights by making the first and fundamental question who
owns the property in the first place. Through the case, generation
after generation of law students have returned to the fictional world
of wholly unappropriated resources and debated the rules for
converting that world into individual ownership.
Interestingly, it was not John Chipman Gray who organized the
study of property law in this way. Gray, a disciple of Christopher
52
Langdell, wrote the first property casebook in 1888. It is hard today
to see the resulting six volume compendium, dominated by sixteenth
and seventeenth century English cases excerpted without explanatory

limitations on individual use of property, with less legal basis, than even English law. Williams,
supra note 19, at 331–36.
48. See Carol M. Rose, Cannons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J.
601, 603–04 (1998) (noting that Blackstone was well aware of the significant familial, feudal and
other legal restrictions on individual property use in his era).
49. Wesley Hohfeld most famously conceptualized property not as defining the
relationship between an individual and a thing, but instead as creating an enforceable series of
rights, privileges and duties in the relations between human beings. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld,
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied to Legal Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913);
see also Singer, supra note 19, at 986–94 (discussing the Hohfeldian concept and its
implications).
50. One of the most famous examples of this is Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543
(1823), which held that American Indians lacked the right to alienate their land to private
individuals, relying largely on the interests of the United States in controlling purchases of such
title.
51. Rose, supra note 48, at 609–10.
52. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 630 (2d ed. 1985). In 1871,
Langdell wrote the first law school casebook, which was on contract law. Id. at 614. Until then
students had learned from textbooks. Id. at 612.

01__BERGER.DOC

2006]

10/13/2006 8:47 AM

PIERSON V. POST

1101

53
notes or text, as initiating the modern era in legal education. Gray
did not include Pierson v. Post at all, and only touched on rights in
wild animals in a case regarding oysters in a deeply buried section on
54
public rights in water.
55
It was likely not until Gray retired from Harvard in 1913 that a
new casebook was proposed. In 1914, Harvard’s faculty decided to
restructure the teaching of the first year classes and with it their
casebooks.56 Professor Edward Warren’s resulting property
57
casebook would look more familiar to modern students. Although
still lacking much in the way of explanatory notes, it is only one
volume, the ancient reports of the Crown have lost pride of place, and
58
Pierson v. Post appears on the first page. This occurred in an era
characterized neither by the passionate defense of individual property
rights of the late nineteenth century, nor the legal realism that
permeated law schools in the 1920s and 1930s. Rather, it was a period
in which progressive scholars, the precursors to the realists, had
begun to question the concept of law as a science divorced from
policy, and in which some legislators were attempting to protect
individual workers from the excesses of industrialization.59

53. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, SELECT CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON THE LAW OF
PROPERTY (2d ed. 1905). It is equally hard to see in the text the man who argued passionately
against private or public restrictions on the individual use of property. Volume two, for
example, starts with a series of decisions by the Crown on the nonalienability of appendant
rights of commonage. 2 id. at 1–4 (2d ed. 1906). A side note for property theory buffs: the copies
of the text held in the Yale Law Library were presented to the library by Wesley Hohfeld, who
was Southmayd Professor of Law there, and appear to include his handwritten notes on
teaching the subject.
54. Id. at 494–95 (excerpting Fleet v. Hegeman, 14 Wend. 42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835)).
Interestingly, this case also arises from a dispute about common property on Long Island,
involving rights to oysters planted in Oyster Bay. Id.
55. See ALEXANDER, supra note 26, at 286 (stating that Gray was on the Harvard faculty
from 1869–1913).
56. WARREN, supra note 20 (noting in the preface that “material changes” were made to
most first-year courses). The decision to restructure their casebooks was likely in response to
complaints that casebooks focused too much on general principles and not enough on the law
applicable to particular American jurisdictions, Rosalind Parma, The Origin, History and
Compilation of the Case-book, 14 LAW LIBR. J. 14, 18–19 (1921), as well as a new theoretical
turn in the study of law in response to the “welter of decisions” that were at that time
overwhelming the legal profession, Edward H. Warren, The Welter of Decisions, 10 ILL. L. REV.
472, 472–73 (1916).
57. WARREN, supra note 20.
58. Id. at 1.
59. See ALEXANDER, supra note 26, at 313–15, 318–19 (discussing the progressive era
reform impulse and its impact on legal theory).
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In this period of growing discomfort with absolute individual
property rights, Pierson v. Post at once faces this unease and
(perhaps) soothes it. The case faces head on what Carol Rose has
60
called “Blackstone’s Anxiety :” the question of how individuals can
claim to own particular property.61 At the same time, the opinion
(particularly as Warren presented it, without Livingston’s dissent)
62
eases that anxiety. In Justice Tompkins’ opinion, we are reassured
by both the distinguished pedigree and the wisdom of American rules
allocating property: not only have authorities from Justinian to
Puffendorf agreed that a wild animal goes to the first person to
physically capture it, but this rule serves society by creating certainty,
and preserves “peace and order” by avoiding this “fertile source of
quarrels and litigation.”63 In addition, by starting with a wild animal,
the case displaces rights in land as the true meaning of property, thus
normalizing property rights in intangibles such as stock and fugitive
resources such as oil in the face of the twentieth century
transformation of the American economy.
Pierson became even more appropriate as law and economics
began to dominate property theory. In early expressions of law and
economics theory, as in Pierson v. Post, the value of the object is
almost irrelevant, and the real question is which property rule will
64
minimize transaction costs (either Tompkins’ bright line rule or
65
Livingston’s existing custom ) and most effectively harness individual
66
self interest (Livingston’s sure reward for productive labor). A host
of contestants to the property casebook crown has arisen in the last
decades, many of them challenging the law and economics bias and
accordingly nudging Pierson further into the casebook.67 But it is still
there, and professors like me who were raised on it may even return
the decision to its former stature in the course. On the two-hundredth

60. Rose, supra note 48, at 605.
61. As Rose points out, after stating the unwillingness of most to look into this question,
Blackstone states that such a willingness would be “‘useless and even troublesome in common
life.’” Id. at 605–06 (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *2).
62. WARREN, supra note 20, at 1, 3.
63. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 179 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 179–80 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 180.
67. See sources cited supra note 23.
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birthday of the decision, it is time to decipher where the case came
68
from.
II. BEFORE THE FOX
In most casebooks, as in the traditional understanding of
property law, the fox is the thing—the land on which it was caught
and the individuals who are fighting to own it are irrelevant. As the
next section shows, however, the land and the distinctive claims that
the Piersons and the Posts had to the use of the land were central to
the litigation that followed. This section discusses the history of that
land, a history that highlights the importance of group rights in the
land, and the political and social dimensions of the struggle for those
rights.
A. Founding of Southampton
Classical American property theory has focused on just two
ownership options: property that individuals own; and property that
no one owns but that is open to individual appropriation by all.69
Locke,70 Blackstone,71 Winthrop,72 and others all cited America as an
example of the latter. The New York Supreme Court’s opinion in
Pierson v. Post follows this tradition, evoking an image of a
wilderness in which no one had superior claims.73 The records of

68. Samuel Isaacharoff notes the easy acceptance of the choice to litigate what seem to be
pointless disputes in Samuel Isaacharoff, The Content of Our Casebooks: Why Do Cases Get
Litigated, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1265, 1265 (2002).
69. See ACHESON, supra note 19, 142–52 (discussing the dichotomy and presenting an
example of a third possibility, shared property rights among a closed group).
70. LOCKE, supra note 17, at 115–16, 118.
71. BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *2–3.
72. John Winthrop, Reasons to be Considered, and Objections with Answers, in 2
WINTHROP PAPERS 138, 141 (Mass. Hist. Soc’y ed., 1931) (“As for the Natives in New England,
they inclose noe Land neither have any setled habytation, nor any tame Cattle to improve the
Land by, and soe have noe other but a Naturall Right to those Countries.”). Of course the
Indian tribes they encountered did not share this vision, and the practices the Europeans and
Americans developed in acquiring tribal land show that they too came to believe that the tribes
possessed the land, however inconvenient this was for their colonizing ambitions. Felix S.
Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 43–47 (1947); see also FELIX S. COHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1 (4th prtg. 1945) (“Most of the land in the United
States, for example, was purchased from Indians, and therefore almost any title must depend for
its ultimate validity upon issues of Indian law . . . .”).
73. As Robert Williams points out, for Locke and many early Americans, the insistence
that property rights required individual enclosure served European and American interests in
denying Indian claims to the land. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The
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Southampton make clear, however, that the town was not founded in
the wilderness of unclaimed land waiting for individual enclosure that
the theorists and the case describe. Before Europeans arrived and for
hundreds of years thereafter, numerous groups claimed and struggled
for community rights to the land on which Southampton was founded.
The underlying conflict between the Piersons and the Posts was part
of this ongoing battle over shared rather than individual property.
The first English settlers of Southampton came largely from the
74
town of Lynn in the Massachusetts Bay Colony. They were just one
of six groups of settlers that fled the ill-fated town,75 escaping a
combination of natural disasters and political and religious
oppression. Cases involving Lynn in the Bay Colony courts provide
evidence of its struggles with the Massachusetts government over
community control.76 In 1639, for example, the General Court at
Boston forbade the community to spread bass or codfish on lands to
77
enrich the soil. Other cases stemmed from battles over religious
orthodoxy. In 1632, radical Puritan minister Stephen Batchellor fled
78
religious persecution in England to settle in Lynn, but found the
colony under the governorship of John Winthrop no more friendly to
religious dissenters.79 The General Court called Batchellor before it
for failing to have his church properly sanctioned by the Anglican
80
Church of Boston and for other “irregularities” of conduct.
Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of
Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 237, 250–53 (1989).
74. FAREN R. SIMINOFF, CROSSING THE SOUND 98 (2004).
75. Id.
76. In Massachusetts Bay, as in most colonies, the General Court performed not only a
judicial function but also made and enforced laws for the colony.
77. 1 ALONZO LEWIS & JAMES R. NEWHALL, HISTORY OF LYNN, 1629–1864, at 182 (1890).
78. Id. at 159–60.
79. The leaders of the colony were staunch members of the Church of England, which
believed in a close connection between church and state. See id. at 164 (describing how
Batchellor’s opposition to the “incipient union of church and state” excited the “indignation” of
the colony leaders). Batchellor was not the only religious refugee from the colony. Roger
Williams was banished in 1636 for his heretical views and went on to found Rhode Island. Anne
Hutchinson was exiled in 1637 after an order preventing the Boston meetings of a ladies social
improvement group. Id. at 163. Winthrop had this telling comment on the order:
That though women might meet, some few together, to pray and edify one another,
yet such a set assembly, where sixty or more did meet every week, and one woman in
a prophetical way, by resolving questions of doctrine, and expounding scripture, took
upon her the whole exercise, was agreed to be disorderly, and without rule.
Id. at 183.
80. Id. at 140, 160. In 1638, Batchellor left Lynn to found the town of Hampton, but did not
find a permanent home there. Id. at 160. He initially found respect and was asked to serve as a
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The town also had to contend with natural misfortunes.
81
Although the town had ample land, much of it was unfit for farming.
Even worse, earthquakes hit the town in 1638 and 1639.82 For some,
the earthquakes were the final straw. In March 1639, a group of
prominent citizens formed the Southampton Company and proposed
to settle on Long Island.83
Even then the land was not an unclaimed wilderness. Many
entities were already asserting their own claims to authorize the
Southampton Company to settle there. The British Royal Council in
London believed that it had the right to dispose of lands in the new
world, and had granted the Earl of Stirling a patent encompassing all

judge in an important land dispute, but then clashed with Timothy Dalton, the Church of
England Pastor there. Id. He was soon sued for propositioning another man’s wife, to which he
reacted by filing a suit for slander, and then, according to town records, he confessed and was
excommunicated, then his house burnt down, and finally, he was denied permission to divorce
his wife although she had been convicted of adultery and ordered to wear a scarlet A. Id. at 160–
61, 164. In 1651, he finally gave up and returned to England. Id. at 161.
81. SIMINOFF, supra note 74, at 99.
82. Id. at 99–100. Yes, earthquakes just outside Boston. The U.S. Geologic Service reports
nineteen earthquakes in Massachusetts before 1973, including a magnitude seven quake in 1755.
U.S. Geologic Service, Earthquake History of Massachusetts, http://earthquake.usgs.gov/
regional/states/massachusetts/history.php (last visited Mar. 7, 2006); see also 1 LEWIS &
NEWHALL, supra note 77, at 182, 209, 243, 252–53 (describing four earthquakes that affected
Lynn between 1639 and 1663).
83. SIMINOFF, supra note 74, at 99. The name of the new settlement suggests religious
affiliation with Batchellor, who hailed from Southampton, England, and called his new
community to the north of Lynn, “Hampton.” 1 LEWIS & NEWHALL, supra note 77, at 160.
However many of the settlers were also from Southampton, id. at 193, and before leaving, the
company contracted with Abraham Pierson, whom John Winthrop called a “godly learned man,
and a member of the [Anglican] church of Boston,” to join them as their pastor, JAMES
TRUSLOW ADAMS, HISTORY OF SOUTHAMPTON 46 n.‡ (1962) (quoting John Winthrop, Journal
Entry (June 5, 1640), in 2 THE HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND, 1630 TO 1649, at 4, 6 (James Savage
ed., 1829)). (Abraham Pierson was probably the brother of Henry Pierson, who was Jesse
Pierson’s great, great, great grandfather.) The selection of Pierson, however, may have been
forced on them by Winthrop, who sought to regulate all colonization of the northeast.
SIMINOFF, supra note 74, at 46. The Southampton settlers did not seem to share Pierson’s views
on the role of the church. In 1644, Abraham Pierson drafted a wildly harsh version of the
Mosaic Code to govern the town, but the code does not seem to have ever been enforced. 1
TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 19–21 (discussing and reprinting the code, which imposed the
death penalty for nineteen crimes, including profaning the lord’s day, incorrigibility by children,
and adultery, but not for rape). Soon after, the town affiliated with the colony of Connecticut,
refusing Abraham Pierson’s wish that it affiliate with the colony of New Haven and permit only
Anglican church members to select the members of the government. GEORGE ROGERS
HOWELL, EARLY HISTORY OF SOUTHAMPTON, L.I., NEW YORK WITH GENEALOGIES 100 (2d
ed. 1887). Abraham Pierson then left the community for Branford, Connecticut. Id.
Interestingly, objection to the entanglement of church and state was also one of the causes of
Batchellor’s clash with Winthrop. 1 LEWIS & NEWHALL, supra note 77, at 164.
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84
of Long Island. At the same time the Dutch government, which had
established a substantial settlement at New Amsterdam (now New
York City), asserted its own entitlement to the area.85
Non-European governments also had property claims to the
land. Governor Winthrop in the Massachusetts Bay Colony was
already challenging the authority of the far-off British Crown to
dictate how and by whom the northeast would be settled.86 Several
Indian tribes claimed rights in the land as well. Although the land had
long been occupied by the Shinnecock people, they had until recently
been under the protection of and paid tribute to the powerful Pequot
tribe of Connecticut.87 Under this arrangement, the Pequots protected
their right to the territory in exchange for control of their trade in
88
wampum, the shell-based currency on which both Indian and
European commerce depended.89 After the Pequots were defeated
90
and enslaved by the British colonists in the Pequot War of 1637, the
Niantic and Narrangansett tribes began eyeing the land, hoping to
claim both it and the wampum it produced.91
The Southampton settlers’ efforts to placate these groups began
a long tradition of community rights in land, in which the central
disputes concerned not who could use particular property but rather
which group could dictate how it could be used. The Southampton
Company first purchased a patent from James Farrett, Lord Stirling’s
agent in America, for eight square miles on Long Island.92 Farrett,
however, had already learned the necessity of placating
Massachusetts Bay: the patent stipulated that it was made upon the
advice and consent of John Winthrop, and that he had the authority
to settle any disputes between the parties.93 The patent also preserved
Stirling’s interest in monopolizing trade with the Indian community.
While the Company could trade with the Indians for “victuals,” they

84. SIMINOFF, supra note 74, at 48.
85. Id. at 10.
86. Id. at 88–91.
87. Id. at 4.
88. Id. at 3.
89. See id. at 5–6 (“[W]ampum became a universally accepted mechanism for propelling
goods and peoples into and through the networks of the emerging Atlantic American world.”).
90. Id. at 57.
91. Id. at 5–6.
92. 1 TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 10.
93. Id. at 9, 10.
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were prohibited from trading for wampum; that right was reserved to
94
Stirling.
Patent in hand, the settlers set up camp on the western end of the
island, brashly cut down the Dutch emblem they found there, and
95
carved a fool’s face in its place. The settlers soon learned that there
were at least two additional groups with claims to the land. Pentawits,
sachem of the Manhassett tribe that allowed the Dutch to occupy the
land, informed his Dutch allies of the settlers’ presence, and the
96
Dutch came and arrested eight of the Southampton Company. They
were released after they agreed to leave the area.97 The Company
received a new patent from Stirling,98 traveled seventy miles to the
eastern tip of Long Island, and settled again. This time they had
learned their lesson and immediately obtained consent to their
settlement from the Shinnecock tribe.99 In exchange they promised
the Shinnecocks goods and, most importantly, a pledge that the
“‘English shall defend us the sayed Indians from the unjust violence
of whatever Indians shall illegally assaill us.’”100
This did not resolve the conflict over who controlled the land and
the community there. In 1664, the Dutch relinquished most of their
North American claims to the British, and the Crown granted Long
Island along with a vast swath of territory to the Duke of York.101
Richard Nicolls, appointed Deputy Governor of “New York,” was
determined to unify the region by stamping out the independent
tendencies of the Long Island towns.102 As part of a broader campaign
to centralize political power over the area, Nicolls demanded that the
Long Island settlements purchase new patents for their land from the

94.
95.

Id. at 10.
ADAMS, supra note 12, at 48 (quoting 14 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE COLONIAL
HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 28–29 (B. Fernow ed., Albany, N.Y., Weed, Parsons &
Co. 1883)).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 49.
98. Id. at 50.
99. Id.
100. Id. This was clearly an effort by the Shinnecocks to secure the English as their new
protectors against the threatened invasion of the Narragansetts and Niantics. But the English
settlers, as we will see later, ultimately proved an even greater threat. See supra notes 72–73 and
infra text accompanying notes 116–18.
101. SUNG BOK KIM, LANDLORD AND TENANT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 8 (1978).
102. See id. at 9.
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103
Southampton objected, writing to Governor General
Duke.
Lovelace that the town had

by right of equity & of law alsoe, many previlidges which many
plantations on the Island hath not, as not only Indian Interest of or
plantation but alsoe Pattent right therein, and whereas it seems to us
as if wee were like to be deprived of those ovr privilidges which at
great rate wee have procured with much dificulty and danger wee
104
have soe many years possessed.

The New York government burned Southampton’s letter of protest,
calling it “‘scandalous, illegal, seditious.’”105
Renewed Dutch claims to Long Island prevented New York
from immediately pressing its claims.106 In October of 1676, however,
New York called Southampton before the General Court of Assizes
for its refusal to obtain patents.107 Again the residents recited their
multiple claims to the land, making clear that not only the purchase
price but their political liberty was at stake:
[T]he patents we have seen seem to bind persons and towns in
matter of payment to the will and pleasure of their lord and his
successors, and who can tell but in time to come those may succeed
who through an avaricious distemper may come upon us with such
heavy taxes as may make us or our poor posterity to groan like
108
Israel in Egypt.

103. Nicolls also quickly promulgated laws requiring gubernatorial approval of town
elections, and installing his appointees as justices of the peace for the towns. Id. at 9–10.
According to Kim:
Nicolls considered these codes, which were “not contrived so Democratically” as
those of other colonies, as an instrument to “revive the Memory of old England
amongst us” and lay in the “foundations of Kingly Government in these parts so farre
as is possible, which truly is grievous to some Republicans.”
Id. at 10 (quoting Nicolls to earl of Clarendon (Apr. 7, 1666), N.Y. HIST. SOC., 2 COLLS. 119
(1869)).
104. 2 TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, app. A at 350 (1877) (records of town meeting, Feb.
22, 1669).
105. ADAMS, supra note 12, at 54.
106. Id.
107. 2 TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 65–66 (1877). The General Court of Assizes was
established by Nicolls to be “the supreme judicial tribunal of the colony,” 1 LEGAL AND
JUDICIAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 269 (Alden Chester ed., 1911), and held not only judicial but
also legislative power, id. at 271.
108. William Pelletreau, Town of Southampton, in RICHARD MATHER BAYLES ET AL.,
HISTORY OF SUFFOLK COUNTY, NEW YORK 1, 11 (1882).
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The court was not impressed. It informed the town residents that they
had forfeited all their rights and privileges in their lands, and the
lands would be forcibly taken from them unless they obtained a new
109
patent by October 23. Reluctantly, the town representatives signed
a patent with Governor Andros.110
Community control, not payment for land use, was central in the
patent. The quit rent for the patent was largely symbolic, consisting of
111
only “one fatt Lamb” per year. The town was already paying far
more in taxes for the land. The manner in which the patentees held
the land was more significant: under both patents their tenure would
be “in free and Common Soccage and by fealty only”112 Under socage
113
tenure, a tenant held the lands by virtue of services to the lord.
“Free and common socage” indicated that the services were
honorable, not menial, and was the form under which knights held
their land.114 The patent, therefore, was essentially an oath of fealty to
the Duke of York and his agent the Governor.115
When Governor Dongan, Andros’ replacement, demanded new
116
patents in 1686, the town did not protest. Perhaps this is because the
town realized that accepting the authority of the Governor over their
lands would provide valuable ammunition against another claimant to
the lands: the Shinnecock Indians. The patent authorized the
Governor to “finally determine the difference” with the tribe, which
apparently claimed the town was using more rights and land than the
tribe had bargained for.117 Not surprisingly, as there is no evidence
that Indians presented their side of the dispute, the Governor found
118
that the town had “lawfully purchased” the lands.

109. 2 TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 65–66 (1877).
110. ADAMS, supra note 12, at 55. The patent is reprinted in full in ADAMS, supra note 83, at
279–80.
111. ADAMS, supra note 83, at 280.
112. Id. at 280, 282.
113. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *78–79.
114. See id. at *79–81.
115. See ROY HIDEMICHI AKAGI, THE TOWN PROPRIETORS OF THE NEW ENGLAND
COLONIES 115–24 (1924) for discussion of a similar conflict in response to Governor Andros’
demand for quit rents and patents of the New England townships. In New England, however,
these demands were generally unsuccessful. Id. at 124.
116. ADAMS, supra note 12, at 55. The patent is reprinted in full in ADAMS, supra note 83, at
281–87.
117. Id. at 282–83.
118. Id.
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With the patent came a new form of government. Dongan’s
patent made of the town “one body Corporate and Politique in Deed
and name by the name of the trusteess of the ffreeholders &
119
These trustees,
comonalty of the towne of Southampton.”
moreover, could hold a public meeting only upon a public summons
to be requested from one of the majesty’s justices of the peace.120
Throughout the period before the Revolutionary War, property
and political rights were fully entangled. The right to authorize
settlement of the land was not a simple transfer of ownership rights.
Rather, it included the right to dictate how it could be used and to
whom its people would owe allegiance. Over a century later, this
theme would repeat in Pierson v. Post, when a battle over community
control was waged through the medium of a lawsuit ostensibly about
a fox.
B. Allocation of Property Rights Among Town Members
In the Southampton community as well, property rights did not
fall into the individual ownership/open-access dichotomy, but
reflected a continuum of shared property rights among varying
groups. The groups sharing those rights ranged from the investors in
the initial settlement, to those that purchased land within the first
decade of settlement, to the Shinnecock tribe that reserved rights in
the lands, to all of the residents of the town. The fox did not make its
famous dash over unclaimed land, in other words, but over land that
had defined the residents’ social and economic status for over a
century. Pierson v. Post arose in the midst of an escalating conflict
over that land’s ownership and control.
The initial agreements regarding property rights were made in
Lynn in 1639 by the “undertakers121:” those who had each contributed
eighty pounds toward the venture of founding a new settlement.122
The undertakers’ early documents (which share elements of both
commercial contracts and town charters) show several kinds of shared
property rights.123 First, the parties to the agreement had rights to the
common lands of the town: “what is layed out for commons shall
continue commons and noe man shall presume to Incroach upon it
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 284.
Id. at 285.
ADAMS, supra note 12, at 44, 45.
ADAMS, supra note 83, at 257.
These are reprinted in id. at 256–59.
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not so much as A handes breadth” without the agreement of the
124
undertakers, or their executors, administrators or assigns. Second,
the town had rights in use of this individual property: each settler was
entitled to a house lot, a planting lot, and a meadow lot, but the
planting lots could never become house lots so as not to “over
charge[] . . . [the] Commons and . . . Impoverish[] . . . the towne.”125
Finally, some rights belonged to the public generally, and could never
be claimed by any individual or group: “ffurthermore noe person . . .
whasoever shall challenge or claime any proper Interest in seas,
rivers, creekes, or brooks howsoever bounding or passing through his
grounds but ffreedom of fishing, fowling and navigation shall be
common to all within the bankes of the said waters whatsoever.”126
Where did this emphasis on shared rights come from? In part,
the agreement reflects land-holding practices in England. English
agricultural areas had for centuries recognized elaborate rights of
commonage.127 These rights arose by long use, by virtue of land
holding in the village, or through direct grant.128 The idea of common
rights in land, therefore, would have been very familiar to these
emigrants from England.
But there were important differences in the commons developed
in Southampton. English law defined commons rights as rights in land
129
owned by another. As the owner of the land was typically the lord
of the manor, and the commons rights belonged to commoners
130
without fee simple title, the English right of commonage enshrined
the status differences of English society. In addition, certain use rights
in the commons land remained exclusively with the lord, including the
right of “mast,” or the fruits of the trees on the land, or the right of

124. Id. at 258.
125. Id. at 257–58.
126. Id. at 258.
127. The most important of these was the common of pasturage. E.C.K. GONNER, COMMON
LAND AND INCLOSURE 8 (2d ed. 1966). Other rights included the common of estover (the right
to collect timber), the common of turbary (the right to cut peat for fuel), and even the delicately
termed common of foldage (the right to the manure left by animals on the commons). Id. at 14–
15.
128. Some rights of common of pasture were “universally assumed in the case of all original
manors,” id. at 8, while others “originate[d] . . . by grant or by peaceful, uninterrupted and
known usage, and could be proved either by deed or by prescription,” id. at 10.
129. See id. at 7 (“Common is ‘a right which one or more persons have to take or use some
portion of that which another’s soil produces.’”).
130. See id.
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“foldage,” the right to the manure from the animals pastured there.
In Southampton, which would have rejected the idea of noble
privilege, the land was owned by those with common rights to it, and
132
only their joint action could limit or expand those rights.
The vehemence of the undertakers’ language regarding the
commons is also interesting given the status of the commons in
England at the time. Beginning in the sixteenth century, a succession
of writers had advocated the agricultural benefits of individual
133
enclosure. The century before the settlers left England was one of
pressure for enclosure of the commons, resulting in a significant
reduction in common lands by the time the settlers left England.134
This in turn resulted in vehement protests on behalf of the peasants
displaced from their lands. The Southampton settlers’ insistence on
common rights, then, may indicate a resistance to the enclosure trend,
and its antidemocratic overtones, rather than a replication of English
practices.
The settlers also believed that assigning shared ownership rights
in the commons would contribute to the prosperity of the community.
They declared that “the delayinge to lay out the bounds of townes
and all such land within the said bowndes hath bene generally the
ruin of townes in this country, therefore wee the said undertakers
have thought good to take upon us the dispose of all landes within
135
our said boundes.” Maintenance of pasture in common may also
have been less expensive and have resulted in fewer disputes than
enclosing land. Enclosing land meant fencing it, fencing took time and
resources, and failure to fence gave rise to bitter arguments.
Residents brought successful lawsuits against those who “hath not
made his proportion of fence as hee ought to have done.”136

131. Id. at 14.
132. See ADAMS, supra note 83, at 258–59 (“[Y]e disposal of the [commons] shall be at the
will and pleasure of us, the undertakers, or executors, administrators and assigns.”).
133. See GONNER, supra note 127, at 121 (“From Fritz Herbert on there is a constant
succession of writers advocating inclosure from the farming point of view.”).
134. Id. at 134–41 & apps. C & D (showing maps of England without common lands at the
end of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries); see also DAVID THOMAS KONIG, LAW AND
SOCIETY IN PURITAN MASSACHUSETTS: ESSEX COUNTY, 1629–1692, at 4 (1979) (stating that in
the century in which the English came to the Massachusetts Bay Colony, “the enclosure of the
common fields had dispossessed thousands and produced a population of menacing ‘sturdy
Beggars’ who streamed into London or wandered about the countryside”).
135. ADAMS, supra note 83, at 257.
136. 2 TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 1 (1877).
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Throughout its first two hundred years the town appointed official
137
“fence viewers” to make sure each maintained their proportion.
Maintenance of the commons was also necessary to abide by
agreements with the Shinnecock tribe. In numerous agreements made
between 1640 and 1712, the tribe had reserved rights in the lands it
ceded. They reserved the right to “breake up ground” in certain areas
for their use, to “cut flags, bulrushes, and such grass as they usually
make their mats and houses of and to dig ground nuts,” as well as the
privilege of “fishing fowling hunting or gathering of berrys or any
138
other thing for our use.” In return, both the town and the tribe
promised not to enclose the lands in which their respective members
139
had usufructuary rights. From a combination of politics, practicality,
and necessity, then, common rights in land were engrained in the
community’s practice.
Although the original undertakers had the rights to control the
common lands under the agreements made in Lynn, many of them
never came to Southampton at all, and others left soon after.140 In
1648, the town voted that rights to the common lands would be
shared among all those owning property in the town by that date.141
After this time, rights to the commons were not acquired

137. David Pierson, father of Jesse Pierson the fox catcher, was repeatedly elected as a fence
viewer. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
138. In the deed of 1640, the Indians reserved “the libertie to breake up ground for theire
use to the westward of the creek afore mentioned on the west side of Shinecock plaine,” 1
TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 13–14, and in 1659, the settlers promised that if “the said
Indians should leave their places within these bounds whereupon they have permission to plant
or dwell, that then the Said land or any parcell thereof shall not be imppriated to or by any
peson what soever in pticuler,” but would remain to the use of the town in common, 2 id. at 207
(1877). In 1659, Wyandanch, sachem of the Shinnecocks, deeded other lands with the agreement
that they would “keepe [their] privilidges of fishing fowling hunting or gathering of berrys or
any other thing for [their] use.” Id. app. D at 354–55. In 1665, the Montauk Indians at Shelter
Island sold Hogs Neck to Southampton, reserving again the privileges of hunting, fishing and
fowling in the town. Id. app. E at 356. And in 1703, the tribe sold the right to farm certain lands
to the town, reserving the right to “cut Flags, Bullrushes and such grass as they usually make
their mats and houses of, and to dig ground nuts, mowing land excepted, any where in the
bounds of the township of Southampton.” 3 id. at 372–73 (1878). At least while the Indians were
troublesome enough to ensure compliance with these agreements and wealthy enough not to
sell these reserved rights, the town would have prevented fencing or allotting a significant
portion of the lands to individual residents.
139. 2 id. at 206–07 (1877) (“Said land” where the Shinnecocks had rights “or any parcel
thereof shall not be apprpriated to or by any person what soever in pticuler”).
140. ADAMS, supra note 83, at 47.
141. 1 TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 50–51.
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automatically by new residents to the town. Rather they were sold,
devised,143 and occasionally promised to useful people as an
inducement to join the town.144 As portions of the common lands were
divided, they would be allotted to those with a share in the
145
commons.
Those with this “privilege of commonage,” who came to be
called the “proprietors,” also had special rights in the lands while they
remained undivided. In 1679, for example, the town trustees ordered
that all “lotters” had the right to take timber from any of the newly
146
divided lands “while they lye unfenced.” In 1695 the town trustees
declared:
Whereas great damage is daylie sustained in the undivided lands of
the Towne, by reason that sundry persons who have no right unto
the said undivided lands . . . turne their jades, Cattle, Sheepe, and
swine into the same, but also cut fire wood and timber, gather stones
and dig clay in and upon ye same, to the grievous damage of the
proprietors of the said undivided lands [such activities were
prohibited without the permission of the trustees]. . . . All wayes
Provided that it shall and may be lawfull for all such persons that
have right [of a share in the commons] . . . to turne out into the said
undivided lands, their own horses, cattle sheepe and swine. . . . [and]
also to cutt timber and firewood, gather stones and dig clay, for their
147
owne particular uses . . . .

Then in 1711, the freeholders of the town voted to appoint a
committee to “enquire into the Rights that each propriety holds in
the undivided Lands,” and that those that did not prove such a right

142. See, e.g., 2 id. at 48 (1877) (recording 1665 and 1666 sales of shares of commonage); id.
at 60 (recording several sales of commonage at Northsea, including one reserving the right to
pasture a cow there).
143. Id. at 61 (recording that Samuel Clark had devised his son a share of commonage in all
future divisions); id. at 70 (recording that James Herrik had devised a fifty-pound commonage
throughout the bounds of the town to his widow for life then to his son).
144. Id. at 104–05 (recording an agreement that John Pinny was to be the town smith for
reasonable rates and in exchange he would get a home lot, twelve acres of woodland, and
“accidental comonage for his creatures, upon the comons, with his neighbors which Land is so
granted upon the condition of His supplying the town” so long as he stayed in the town, and
permanently if he remained longer than five years).
145. Similar rights in undivided land were provided to the original town settlers throughout
New England. See AKAGI, supra note 115, at 3.
146. Id. at 75–76.
147. 5 TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 150–51 (order of trustees, June 11, 1695).
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“shall have no Liberty to Pasture any creature in the common
148
field.”
Between 1663 and 1782, much of the common land was allotted
and divided among the proprietors. As the proprietors sold the newly
allotted lands to new migrants to the town, the balance between
proprietors and nonproprietors began to shift. Those with rights in
the commons, who had once been a majority of town residents,
149
gradually became a minority. At the same time, the proprietors
reserved to themselves increasingly burdensome rights in the lands
once they were sold to others. In the 1763 division of the Quogue
area, for example, the proprietors reserved to themselves “free liberty
at all times hereafter to dig clay in any of the above said lots for their
own use” as well as the right to use a stream passing through the land
and dig to let the stream pass into a nearby pond.150 In laying out the
Little South division that same year, the proprietors reserved a
section of common land where they alone could dig clay and burn
brick.151
This rapid development and enclosure of the commons also
disadvantaged those without the means to own property. In the Little
South division, for example, it was agreed that with respect to the
“Indian or Mulatto houses that stand upon any of the above lots or
amendments, the owners of them shall have liberty to move them off
if they cant agree with the owners of the land.”152 This “liberty” was
probably not regarded as much of a privilege by those that now had
to find a new home site and somehow transport their homes there.
The Revolutionary War added severe economic stress to the land
use struggles. The Southampton residents were fervent
revolutionaries. All but one of the town residents signed an oath of

148. 2 id. at 147 (1877). Those with rights to the commons were expected to respect others’
rights in them. For example, town members brought court actions against John Topping for
fencing off a portion of the commons for his individual use, id. at 18, and against Zerobbabel
Phillips and his wife for the death of a cow after they allegedly “had trespassed by digging in the
common & thereby the cow lost her life,” id. at 32–33.
149. William S. Pelletreau, The Rights of the Proprietors to the Bottoms of the Bays in the
Town of Southampton, THE SEA-SIDE TIMES (Feb. 23, 1883), in George R. Howell,
Southampton Historical Pamphlets 94 (1947) (unpublished compilation of documents in the
possession of the New York Historical Society).
150. 3 TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 199 (1878).
151. Id. at 227.
152. Id. at 228.
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153
loyalty to the Continental Congress in May of 1775, and the town
raised two companies of militia to join the revolutionary forces in
February 1776.154 But after the American defeat in the disastrous
Battle of Long Island, the British occupied the Island, using the crops
and herds of the rebellious eastern towns as their larder. Ships sent
from Connecticut to join the battle instead helped the Island’s
155
residents to escape, and the Continental Congress soon ordered the
residents to remove themselves and as much of their stock as
possible.156 While some residents used their whaling ships and
157
knowledge of the coast to harass the British, many spent the six
years of war in Connecticut in a “destitute and helpless condition,”158
largely forbidden to return home for supplies, and often plundered by
159
British and American privateers when they did. Those that returned
to Southampton after the war found the town impoverished and
ravaged by the British troops.160

153. This was essentially the case in all of Suffolk County. See FREDERIC GREGORY
MATHER, THE REFUGEES OF 1776 FROM LONG ISLAND TO CONNECTICUT 1055–65 (1913)
(reprinting lists of signers of the Oath of Association). This was in stark contrast to the Queens
and Kings Counties, which lay between Suffolk and mainland New York. Queens County issued
declarations insisting on its desire to remain at peace with Great Britain and not fight on either
side, id. at 1050–54, while after the Battle of Long Island, the residents of Kings County signed
an effusive declaration proclaiming their loyalty and ardent affection to the King, id. at 1050–51.
154. Id. at 994–1003 (reprinting the membership of the militia of Suffolk County). It is not
clear whether these companies actually participated in the Battle of Long Island, or were
intercepted on their march to join the battle by news of the disastrous defeat there. Id. at 40–41.
Compare William Pelletreau, Introduction to 3 TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at i, vi (1878)
(saying that the companies were intercepted), with ADAMS, supra note 12, at 128 (saying that
the companies merged into Colonel Smith’s regiment and participated in the Battle).
155. 15 THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT (J. Hammond Trumbull
and Charles J. Hoadly eds., AMS Press and Johnson Reprint Corp. reprint 1968), available at
http://www.colonialct.uconn.edu/ViewPageByPageNew.cfm?v=15&p=511&c=4 (reports of Sept.
1, 1776).
156. MATHER, supra note 153, at 695 (minutes of Continental Congress, Aug. 29, 1776 &
Sept. 3, 1776).
157. Pelletreau, supra note 154, at vii.
158. THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT, supra note 155, at 522,
available at http://www.colonialct.uconn.edu/ViewPageByPageNew.cfm?v=15&p=522&c=4
(report of Sept. 18, 1776).
159. Id. at 201–03; see also ADAMS, supra note 12, at 135 (“This was . . . largely to reduce the
supplies which otherwise would serve to support the British . . . , and it was this unfortunate
situation . . . [which] caused them to be harried by friend as well as foe.”).
160. Pelletreau, supra note 154, at vii–viii. A 1790 petition that records the effect of the war
on John Foster of Sag Harbor is reprinted in MATHER, supra note 153, app. B at 719. Writing
from debtors’ prison, Foster records how he was elected as a representative to the Continental
Congress, and during the war shipped military stores for the revolutionary army, because by so
doing he made himself “particularly obnoxious to the enemy.” Id. The British burnt Foster’s
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Other factors cast further doubt on Lodowick Post’s declaration
that he started the fox on “unpossessed and waste land.”
Socioeconomic changes instead were placing significant pressure on
all town lands. The population of the town exploded in the postwar
period. After increasing by only 50 percent between 1698 and the
start of war, the town’s population quadrupled between 1776 and
161
1800. In addition, the town records reflect increasing pressure from
population growth and economic distress. From the earliest years,
there had been references to the poor of Southampton: a 1661 will
devised five pounds to the poor of the town,162 and a 1662 will devised
a mare foal to their benefit.163 But in the years after the Revolutionary
War the status of the poor became a pressing concern of the town as a
whole. For the first time, the town set aside funds specifically for the
support of the poor, starting at 100 pounds in 1786, and rising as high
as 400 pounds in 1797. In the 1786 town meeting, the residents voted
that the overseers of the poor were “impowered to bind out to
apprentice all such children whose parents they shall judge unable to
maintain them,” and that “when they shall see any idle persons who
has no means of gaining an honest livelihood, be impowered to take
up such person & put him to labor.”164
These harsh measures apparently did not work. Starting in 1799,
the orders were accompanied by a vote ordering “that the overseers
of the poor meet with the Trustees on the 3d Tuesday of April instant
165
to devise some cheaper or better plan for the support of the poor.”
166
Similar meetings were ordered in each of the next three years, and

ship, his home, his outbuildings, and plundered his books and goods—a loss of 2,000 pounds. Id.
Foster found himself unable to pay debts incurred while supporting his large family in
Connecticut, and so pled with the State Treasurer to sign as a creditor for the discharge of his
bonds. Happily, the petition was marked “granted.” Id.
161. From a population of 738 white and 84 black residents in 1698, see 1698 Inhabitants of
Southhampton, Suffolk County, New York, http://olivetreegenealogy.com/nn/census/
inhabsouthhamp.shtml (reprinting 1 EDMUND B. O’CALLAGHAN, THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 437–47 (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. 1849)), the
population only increased by 50 percent to 1227, by 1776, just before the war, see MATHER,
supra note 153 apps. A53, A54, but quadrupled to 3,672 by the taking of the 1800 census, see
1800 Census—New York, http://www.census-online.com/links/NY/1800.html (last visited June
25, 2005).
162. 2 TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 9 (1877).
163. Id. at 25.
164. 3 id. at 311 (1878) (recording an April 4, 1786 meeting).
165. Id. at 357 (reporting an April 2, 1799 meeting).
166. Id. at 358, 359, 361 (reporting the 1800 meeting, the 1801 meeting, and the 1802
meeting).
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the minutes of the 1802 town meeting suggest impatience with their
lack of success: the overseers were ordered to meet with the trustees
167
“to consult about keeping the poor as usual.”
The position of slaves and free blacks in the community was also
changing. The closing of the commons had displaced both African
Americans and American Indians who had built their homes on this
land, and would have generally disadvantaged those without formal
property rights.168 Although a number of slave manumissions are
recorded in the postwar period, under a 1785 law, before a slave could
be freed the overseers of the poor had to certify that the individual
was “under 50 years of age and able to provide for himself.”169 This
law suggests town resistance to the growth of a free black community,
or at least the poverty facing those with freedom but no property and
little opportunity.170
Like many communities in the wake of the Revolutionary War,
Southampton was also burdened by taxes levied to pay the war debt.
Although Long Island had suffered approximately $500,000 in
property loss during the war, it was taxed $37,000 by the state for its
failure to take an active role in the war.171 In 1788, town residents
anxiously authorized the trustees to find some way to raise money for
the state taxes, and do something to ease the burden for the following
year.172

167. Id. at 361 (reporting an April 6, 1802 meeting).
168. See, e.g., id. at 228 (reprinting report of surveyors of the 1763 enclosure that “the Indian
or Mulatto houses that stand upon any of the above lots or amendments, the owners of them
shall have liberty to move them off if they cant agree with the owners of the land”).
169. Id. at 319, 327.
170. There do appear to have been some, albeit inferior, educational opportunities for this
population: there were at least three schools educating African Americans in Southampton, as
indicated by names like “Rufus Negro” and “Silas Negro” on attendance lists of schools at
which the teachers received substantially less than those at other schools. See 5 id. at 136–38
(recording 1796 attendance lists for North Sea, Quogue, and Ketchabonak schools, at which
teacher salaries were about ten pounds per quarter, while teachers at other schools received
between sixteen and eighteen pounds per quarter).
171. ADAMS, supra note 12, at 140–41.
172. 3 TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 325 (1878) (reporting a December 30, 1788 town
meeting).
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III. OF PIERSONS AND POSTS, FOXES AND COMMONS
The lawsuit between the Piersons and the Posts arose at the turn
of the nineteenth century,173 in the midst of this economic and political
turmoil. The townspeople had not recovered from their losses after
the war, and the soil was depleted, making farming more difficult.
The poor of the town, including the African Americans and Indians
displaced with the enclosure of the commons, were a more visible and
pressing problem. A few individuals, however, had experienced new
wealth in the growing postwar whaling industry and West India trade.
The population of the town was also changing, with new residents
asserting equal rights in the common lands that the original settlers
had long claimed for their own. The Piersons and the Posts were both
leaders in this community, but the Piersons’ position came from the
town’s traditional source of prestige and rights, while the Posts’ came
from the new sources of economic success. Their dispute, I believe,
arose out of the clash between these different conceptions of the
appropriate rights and uses of property.
The first place that the historical record conflicts with the case as
reported is in its description of the land on which Jesse Pierson caught
the fox. All of the facts relied on by the New York Supreme Court
came from Lodowick Post’s declaration in filing the case.174 According
to these facts, Post did
“upon a certain wild and uninhabited, unpossessed and waste land,
called the beach, find and start one of those noxious beasts called a

173. As the records of the case have been destroyed, it is not clear exactly when the dispute
arose. One historian, writing in 1935, estimated that the dispute arose in 1796. WILLIAM
DONALDSON HALSEY, SKETCHES FROM LOCAL HISTORY 131 (1935). If an 1895 writer is
correct that Jesse Pierson was walking home from teaching school at the time, then this is too
early, as Jesse was only fifteen and still in school himself. See 5 id. at 129–30 (listing Jesse
Pierson among the students at Bridghampton School in 1796). It also probably occurred well
before October 1803, when Nathan Post, Lodowick’s father, died, see Adams, supra note 12 at
222, as his insistence seemed to have been a significant factor in the prosecution of the case, see
Hedges, supra note 15 (“Capt. Post declared Lodowick should have the fox. Capt. David
Pierson declared, with equal decision, his son Jesse should have it. . . . Pierson carried the fox
home. Post sued him . . . .”). A safe guess is that the famous fox hunt took place sometime
between 1800 and 1803.
174. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (“A verdict having been
rendered for the plaintiff below, the defendant there sued out a certiorari, and now assigned for
error, that the declaration and the matters therein contained were not sufficient in law to
maintain an action.”); Charles Donahue, Jr., Animalia ferae naturae: Rome, Bologna, Leyden,
and Queens County, N.Y., in STUDIES IN ROMAN LAW IN MEMORY OF A. ARTHUR SCHILLER,
39, 43 n.15 (Roger S. Bagnall & William V. Harris eds., 1986) (“When a declaration is
challenged as insufficient in law, the factual allegations in the declaration are taken as true.”).
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fox,” and whilst there hunting, chasing and pursuing the same with
his dogs and hounds, and when in view thereof, Pierson, well
knowing the fox was so hunted and pursued, did, in the sight of Post,
175
to prevent his catching the same, kill and carry it off.

For generations of law students, these words have evoked a
wind-swept wilderness. But Judge Henry Hedges, a prolific local
historian writing in 1895, wrote that the fox
found refuge in an old shoal well near Peter’s pond, not far from the
ocean shore . . . . Jesse, who had been teaching school at
Amagansett, on his way home saw the fox fleeing from his pursuers
and run into the hiding place as a refuge. In a moment, with a
176
broken rail, he was at the well’s mouth and killed the fox . . . .

Hedges’ report suggests that the Piersons had a particular claim
to the land on which the fox was caught. Peter’s Pond lay in the
undivided lands just before the portion of Sagg Street on which both
David and Jesse Pierson’s home and the homes of a half-dozen other
Piersons were located.177 The Piersons were a farming family, and
would have used the land to pasture their stock. In England, farmers
resented the damage caused by English gentry chasing game over
their common fields.178 Lodowick, riding across the pasture closest to

175. Pierson, 3 Cai. at 175.
176. Hedges, supra note 15. Hedges did not move to Southampton until 1854, after both
Lodowick and Jesse had died, but moved at age fourteen to East Hampton, and was a friend of
Jesse’s son David Pierson, Jr. Hedges had met Jesse and Lodowick when he was a young man,
but does not seem to have discussed the case with the parties personally. See ADAMS, supra
note 12, at 166 (noting Hedges moved to East Hampton in 1831, when he was 14, and moved to
Southampton in 1854); Hedges, supra note 15 (stating Hedges knew Jesse and Lodowick
himself). Hedges states for example, that he could not discover whether the Sanford listed as
Pierson’s attorney was Nathan Sanford. Id. His account, therefore, provides some helpful details
but not a complete story.
177. HALSEY, supra note 173, at 200 (providing a map extending from Water Mill to
Wainscott from about the year 1800 showing Peter’s Pond and Sagg Street with locations of
Pierson homes).
178. E.P. Thompson, for example, quotes the following farmer’s protests against the protests
that permitted gentry to hunt while common people were forbidden:
[I]f a keeper or game-keeper, that wears his master’s livery, may come into my
grounds, break down my hedges, trample over my corn with impunity, while I that am
the sufferer dare not be known to have a bird in my house, I know both how to resent
and how to revenge it, which every farmer knows too, as well as I . . . .
E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGINS OF THE BLACK ACT 100 (1975).
Anthony Trollope, mid-nineteenth century chronicler of English hunting, wrote that hunting
was only possible because the farmers themselves hunted and so were willing to tolerate the
damage it caused, and that American farmers would never tolerate this imposition:
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the Piersons’ home with his dogs and hounds would not have been
much more welcome.
Equally important, the location indicates that the fox was not
caught on truly unclaimed land, but on some of the last common land
in the community, over which the members in the town were in a
bitter fight for ownership and control. The commons were still crucial
to Southampton’s agricultural economy. The sheep pastured there
were looked after by a common shepherd, and families competed for
179
the right to the “fertilizer” they left behind. The economic and
population pressure in the wake of the Revolutionary War had
created increasing competition for the common land and resources of
180
the town. In 1796 the town residents voted that hogs be taken off
the common, and that “the trustees do everything in their power by
making laws to prevent the oysters being taken away.”181 In 1798, hogs
were again voted off the commons, and the trustees were further
182
authorized to regulate the taking of seaweed.
The town also began to turn to the common land as a resource to
183
commodify and sell for the benefit of the town. In 1801, the trustees
sold eight individuals the “sole privilege” to take fish from Great
Let him talk to the American farmer of English hunting, and explain to that
independent, but somewhat prosaic husbandman, that in England two or three
hundred men claim the right of access to every man’s land during the whole period of
the winter months! The French countryman cannot be made to understand it. You
cannot induce him to believe that if he held land in England, looking to make his rent
from tender young grass-fields and patches of sprouting corn, he would be powerless
to keep out intruders, if those intruders came in the shape of a rushing squadron of
cavalry, and called themselves a hunt. . . . Nor would the English farmer put up with
the invasion, if the English farmer were not himself a hunting man.
ANTHONY TROLLOPE, HUNTING SKETCHES, ILLUSTRATED AND WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
LIONEL EDWARDS 80 (1952).
179. ADAMS, supra note 12, at 158.
180. This pressure increased in the following decades, to the point that in 1821, the
Bridgehampton inhabitants wrote a petition protesting that land the town had set apart as a
burial ground was now being “enclosed for ploughing or pasture . . . [and] although the remains
of the deceased are not injured, as they are alike insensible to all terrestrial affairs, yet common
decency requires that we your petitioners should remonstrate to your honorable body.” 5 TOWN
RECORDS, supra note 14, at 123.
181. 3 id. at 349 (1878) (reporting an April 5, 1796 election meeting).
182. Id. at 354 (reporting an April 3, 1798 election meeting).
183. Earlier measures had given individuals special privileges in the waters, but these had
generally been given in exchange for services of value to the whole town. So in 1686, the town
voted that Obadiah Rogers could have the privilege of a stream for a mill, provided he built the
mill and provided the town with cloth at reasonable rates. 2 id. at 106 (1877). And in 1786, the
town voted that three individuals could have the privilege to the otter pond to dig through to
the salt water to create a fish pond provided they built and maintained a bridge at least twelve
feet wide. 3 id. at 306–07 (1878).
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Fresh Pond and the adjoining creek, along with the right to obtain a
184
ten dollar penalty from anyone else who fished with nets there. In
1804, the Suffolk Gazette advertised that by order of the trustees, the
seine fisheries in “all the bays and waters belonging to the town of
Southampton” would be hired out between December and the
following April.185 In April of the same year, the town complained of
the encroachments made by individuals enclosing the common lands,
voting that the trustees should order these individuals to “throw it out
or pay for it, as the trustees may think proper.”186
New demands on the commons led to bitter conflict between the
proprietors and the rest of the town residents.187 The proprietors
would have believed that justice was on their side. As they had
argued to Governor Andros a century before, their rights were based
on the risks they incurred in settling the town, their long residence, as
well as the authorization they had purchased from Lord Stirling, the
Shinnecock Tribe, and Governors Andros and Dongan. At the same
time, town residents without rights in the commons would have seen
such claims as inimical to the spirit of the American Revolution: why
should time, inheritance, or English patent give any town resident a
superior right to acquire and use property? The resulting disputes
were “very injurious to the peace and harmony of said inhabitants.”188
In the decade after Pierson v. Post, the proprietors would push their
demands even further, claiming exclusive rights even in the products
of the town’s waters.189 During this period, “the word Proprietor was
another name for grasping, unscrupulous avarice.”190
By 1816, each side acknowledged the need to resolve the conflict,
and after much discussion, agreed that the town would cede all its

184. Id. at 359–60 (reporting an Oct. 13, 1801 order). The price was listed as “$7.50 pearly,”
which probably should be yearly. Id.
185. The Seine Fisheries, 1 SUFFOLK GAZETTE, no. 43, Dec. 10, 1804, at 4.
186. 3 TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 367 (1878) (reporting an April 3, 1804 town
meeting).
187. In New England, similar conflicts had arisen in the previous century as nonproprietors
began to outnumber proprietors in those towns. AKAGI, supra note 115, at 124–34; see also
KONIG, supra note 134, at 50 (discussing conflicts over shares in commons in Massachusetts
after 1660 when General Court limited creation of new commonage shares).
188. NEW YORK LEGISLATURE, JOURNAL OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK at 535 (entry on Mar. 21, 1818).
189. See Pelletreau, supra note 14, at ix (“[I]t was not until they began to lay claim to all
lands under water, and attempted to control the fishing privileges, that any serious controversy
arose.”).
190. Id.
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claims to the common lands in favor of the proprietors, and the
proprietors in turn would cede their claims to the products of the
191
waters. The new property division required a new division of
governmental power. The proprietors elected their own trustees—the
192
Trustees of the Proprietors—to administer their rights. In 1818, the
New York legislature enacted this resolution as state law.193 Even
after this resolution, the town and proprietors continued to fight over
their rights in the resources. One historian, writing in 1962, declared:
I have myself . . . heard the claim made for them that the fee [in the
highway] is still theirs, and that if the town abandoned any
highway . . . on which the Proprietors had originally allotted land on
either side only, that the road bed of the highway so abandoned
would revert to the representatives of the Proprietors and not to the
194
abutting property owners.

No proprietor with a stake in this struggle would have called the land
where the fox was caught, as Lodowick Post’s declaration did, an
“unpossessed and waste land.” To a proprietor it might not have been
individually divided but it was certainly possessed—by the
proprietors.
David Pierson and his first-born son Jesse were clearly among
the proprietors to the common lands. Both were descendants of
Henry Pierson, one of the original settlers of Southampton.195 The
wife of one of the original undertakers had sued Henry in 1664,
challenging his right to a share in the common lands, but a jury
rejected her claims.196 After this point the Pierson descendants were
consistently listed among those eligible to draw for each division of
lands, and David Pierson appears on this list for the 1782 division.197
The Piersons also appear to have been among those that continued to

191. ADAMS, supra note 12, at 59.
192. Id. at 59–60.
193. An Act relative to the common and undivided lands and marshes in Southampton, in
the county of Suffolk, Act of Apr. 15, 1818, ch. CLV, 1818 N.Y. Laws 140–41, 41st sess., 140–41.
194. ADAMS, supra note 12, at 227.
195. Henry was probably the brother of Abraham Pierson, the town’s short-lived first
minister. Pelletreau, supra note 14, at vi. Henry first appears in the town records in 1643, and
served as town clerk for many years; the archivists of the town records are thankful for his fine
hand. He served on the committees negotiating with the Shinnecock tribe and Governor
Andros. Henry’s son, also Henry Pierson, negotiated with Governor Dongan and was the town’s
first delegate to the colonial New York Assembly in 1695.
196. 2 TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 41–42 (1877).
197. 3 id. at 291–301 (1878).
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press the claims of the proprietors after the 1816 compromise. David
Pierson Jr., Jesse’s son and David’s grandson, was one of the
defendants in the “famous Sagg Mill Cause” of 1839, in which several
proprietors set up two windmills in the undivided lands claiming
(unsuccessfully) they had obtained a legal right to do so from the
trustees of the proprietors.198
David Pierson Sr. was also an avid enforcer of community
property norms. Starting in 1771, when he was just twenty, David was
elected at least thirteen times either as a town “fence viewer,”
charged with ensuring that individuals maintained their portion of
fence against straying animals and did not fence in land that was not
their own, or as a commissioner of highways, charged with enforcing
the public rights-of-way and compensating landowners for new roads
on their land.199 David was a town leader in other ways as well: he was
three times elected as town trustee, once as commissioner of schools,
200
and once as a tax collector. He served on the committee charged
with bringing a new minister, Reverend Aaron Woolworth, to the
201
town in 1787, and was elected captain of Bridgehampton’s first
company of Minute and Militia Men in February 1776.202 David was
known as a strict Calvinist,203 and his gravestone reads, “He was

198. HALSEY, supra note 173, at 126–28; see also ADAMS, supra note 12, at 227.
199. 5 TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 105–06 (listing his 1771 selection as commissioner
of highways); id. at 106–07 (listing his 1772 selection as commissioner of highways); id. at 107–08
(listing his 1774 selection as trustee); id. at 112–13 (listing his 1784 selection as trustee and
commissioner of highways); 3 id. at 321 (1878) (listing the 1788 selection as commissioner of
highways); id. at 326 (listing his 1789 election as commissioner of highways); id. at 330 (listing
him in 1790 as commissioner of highways); id. at 331 (listing his 1790 selection as fence viewer);
id. at 333 (listing his 1791 selection as fence viewer and commissioner of highways); id. at 334–35
(listing his 1792 selection as fence viewer and commissioner of highways); id. at 337 (listing his
1793 election as fence viewer); id. at 344–45 (listing his 1795 election as tax collector, fence
viewer and overseer of highways); id. at 348 (listing his 1796 election as fence viewer and
trustee); id. at 354 (listing his 1798 selection as fence viewer); id. at 357 (listing his 1799 selection
as fence viewer and commissioner of schools).
200. Id. at 107–08 (listing his 1774 selection as trustee); id. at 112–13 (listing his 1784
selection as trustee); 3 id. at 344–45 (1878) (listing his 1795 election as tax collector, fence viewer
and overseer of highways); id. at 348 (listing his 1796 selection as trustee); id. at 357 (listing his
1799 selection as fence viewer and commissioner of schools).
201. See ADAMS, supra note 12, at 193–94 (reprinting an agreement between Reverend
Woolworth and the town).
202. Id. at 126–27. Although Captain Pierson and his family were forced to flee to
Connecticut after the Battle of Long Island, Pierson reenlisted there, and had achieved the rank
of corporal by 1781. See MATHER, supra note 153, at 505, 1035 (listing David Pierson among
refugees from Long Island to Connecticut and his service in the Connecticut militia).
203. Hedges, supra note 15.
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distinguished for strong mental power firmness of character & strict
204
205
integrity.” Jesse Pierson, David’s son, was born in 1780 during the
Piersons’ refuge in Connecticut during the Revolutionary War, and
he went on to serve as a schoolmaster in Sag Harbor for many
years.206 The Piersons seem to have been central members of the local
community, and adherents, perhaps to the point of rigidity, to its
traditions.
Where were the Posts in this picture? Although one genealogy
records Nathan Post as among the descendants of Lieutenant Richard
Post, who immigrated to Southampton from Lynn in the 1640s
207
and whose descendants had a share in the commons, another does
208
not. If the first genealogy is correct, Nathan was unusually alienated
from his family. He is never recorded as living in the same area as his
alleged father or brothers, and as an adult he lived in the hamlet of
Bridgehampton rather than in town of Southampton where they were
located.209 Nathan is not listed as an executor in his alleged brothers’
wills, although they list each other as executors.210 Similarly, Nathan
211
listed only his young son and his friends as his executors. Nathan is
also not listed among the lotters for the 1782 division of the

204. ADAMS, supra note 12, at 319.
205. Id.
206. HALSEY, supra note 173, at 131.
207. HOWELL, supra note 83, at 353–54.
208. See LONG ISLAND GENEALOGIES 263–65 (Mary Powell Bunker compiler, Joel
Munsell’s Sons 1895) (listing Richard Post’s descendants; Nathan Post is not among them).
209. See 3 TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14 (1878) (listing many Posts on map of Main Street,
Southampton at the beginning of the volume); HALSEY, supra note 173, at 199 (showing Nathan
and Lodowick Post on map extending from Water Mill to Wainscott about the year 1800).
Neither Nathan nor Lodowick ever appears near the names of any other Posts on the various
censuses of the period, providing more evidence that they lived in different areas. Compare 3
TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 392 (1878), with id. at 396 (reprinting the 1776 census in
which Nathan Post is east of Water Mill and is not listed with the other Posts who are west of
Water Mill).
210. In 1790, Henry Post appointed his wife and “my two brothers Stephen Post & Jeremiah
Post” joint executors of his estate. Will of Henry Post (written 1790, probated 1791), in Suffolk
County Surrogate’s Court, Liber A at 240 (on file with the author). After Henry died in 1791,
Stephen wrote his own will, designating his brother Jeremiah and his son Samuel his executors.
Will of Stephen Post (written 1791, probated 1831), in Suffolk County Surrogate’s Court, file
2251 (on file with the author).
211. In making a will in 1798 Nathan designated his twenty-one-year-old son Lodowick and
his friends Lemuel Pierson and Thomas Gelston as executors of his estate, rather than Stephen
or Jeremiah, who were both living at the time. Will of Nathan Post (written 1798, probated
1804), in Suffolk County Surrogate’s Court, Liber B, at 272 (on file with the author).
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212
commons. He appears either not to have been descended from the
original settlers of the town, or not to have inherited a right to the
common lands. In either case, the contest over the fox would have
added significance to both sides. For the Piersons, it would have been
a fight for the hard-earned right for privileges in the common lands,
while for the Posts, it would have been a fight for equal status within
the community.
The record also suggests another reason for the division between
the families. The Piersons appear to have been educated gentleman
farmers. The Posts, however, were newly wealthy and eager to display
it, and their wealth came not from agriculture but from commerce
and profit from the War. For them, the land was not a resource for
the thrifty farmer, but a site of recreational hunting. The conflict
between the families thus concerned not only use of land, but also
how status in the community would be defined.
Nathan Post had the misfortune of having the most detailed
description of him appear in the memoirs of Stephen Burroughs, who
was a schoolmaster at Bridgehampton in 1793 and 1794. Burroughs
clashed with Bridgehampton minister Reverend Aaron Woolworth
213
over the choice of books for a new town library. Burroughs was
eventually forced to leave the town (not a unique experience for
him—Burroughs seems to have been too nonconformist for his own

212. 3 TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 294–301 (1878) (listing lotters for 1782 division).
There are two minor pieces of evidence that Nathan came to America from Scotland in the
early 1770s. First, the family bible, in which the births, deaths, and marriages starting with the
births of Nathan and his wife are recorded, was printed in Edinburgh, Scotland in 1769. Bible
Records of the Post Family (Southampton Colony Chapter of the Daughters of the American
Revolution, compiler, 1949) (East Hampton Library, The Pennypacker Long Island Collection,
East Hampton, New York). Second, the name Lodowick, which the couple named their first
born son, is of Scottish origin. COOPER, supra note 10. These facts, however, are far from
conclusive, especially because Nathan appears already to have been a man of property by 1776,
and because immigrants adopted many different name spellings once they reached the new
world.
213. See 2 STEPHEN BURROUGHS, MEMOIRS OF STEPHEN BURROUGHS 59 (B.D. Packard
1811) (“[T]he clamor still increased against the books which I had offered for the library. Mr.
Woolworth and Judge Hurlbut were in a state of great activity on this subject, and their
perpetual cry was, that I was endeavoring to over throw all religion, morality and order in the
place; was introducing corrupt books into the library, and adopting the most fatal measures to
over throw all the good old establishments.”). The library books that generated the controversy
highlight the difference between our time and theirs: they included Plutarch’s lives, Voltaire’s
Histories, and Hume’s history, id. at 59–60, all of which seem to have been too racy for some of
the parish.
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214
good), and his memoirs dwell on his own irreproachable conduct in
the affair and the villainy of all who persecuted him.
Nathan Post was one of Reverend Woolworth’s three strongest
215
supporters in the library affair, and Burroughs paints him—like the
216
other supporters —as dishonest and of little intelligence. He
describes Nathan’s captaincy during the War as one of cowardice
217
toward the enemy and cruelty toward his men, and portrays his war
profits as the result of cheating his officers of their full share.218 After
he used his war prizes to purchase a one-third share in a ship in the
West India trade, Burroughs claims, Post mysteriously grew rich,
acquiring “a considerable farm, and the most elegant building of any
in the county,” while his two partners suffered loss and ultimate
bankruptcy.219 Burroughs tells us that

Capt. Post descended from parentage extremely low and poor;
accordingly his education was rough and uncouth. Yet he possessed
a strong desire to be thought a man of information and importance.
This frequently led him to tell large, pompous stories, of which
himself was ever the hero. He was a great swaggerer over those
whom he found calculated to bear it; but to others he was supple,
220
cringing, and mean.

How much of this should we credit? Nathan’s gravestone (not
surprisingly) presents a very different picture, stating that “He was a
respectable Magistrate, a kind relation, a good Patriot and an honest
man. The memory of the just is blessed. This corruptible shall put on
incorruption and this mortal immortality.”221 The reality is probably
somewhere between the two accounts. Service on a privateer, for
example, was perhaps not the war service most demanding of courage
or self-sacrifice, consisting of running from warships with more fire

214. See id. at 89–90 (“Judge Hurlbut and Henry Pierson, Justicies of the Peace, granted a
warrant for the removal of me, my wife and children.”); id. at 102 (“I LEFT Long Island.”).
215. See id. at 40–41 (listing Captain Post as a “most intimate companion[] with whom Mr.
Woolworth perpetually associated”).
216. See, e.g., id. at 40 (“[Justice Hurlbut] likewise was a person of very moderate abilities,
full of religious Professions, but not so careful to commend himself to the consciences of others
for his dishonesty.”).
217. Id. at 41.
218. See id. (“[S]ome small prizes fell into his hands; . . . besides some small donations from
the private property of the officers who fell under his power.”).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Transcribed in ADAMS, supra note 12, at 334.
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power, capturing unarmed merchant vessels, and profiting from the
222
capture. In addition, unlike other men of his age, Nathan did not
sign up for the militia before the Long Islanders had to flee to
223
Connecticut in 1776. But it seems unlikely that Nathan would have
been promoted from first lieutenant to captain224 had his courage and
honesty been as little as Burroughs would have us believe. It is also
unlikely that Nathan would have been elected a town trustee soon
after Burroughs knew him225 had he been known to have abused his
men, cheated his officers, and defrauded his partners.226
But Nathan’s livelihood as a merchant mariner in the West India
trade and the opulence of his home are both corroborated by other
writers.227 Contemporary maps show the house in the very center of

222. See 8 NAVAL DOCUMENTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (William James Morgan
ed., 1979) [hereinafter NAVAL DOCUMENTS] at 12, 130–31 (1980) (reprinting journal accounts
of Post’s ship the Revenge); 9 id. at 857, 963, 967 (1986) (reprinting journal and newspaper
accounts of the Revenge). Of course, the fans of Patrick O’Brien’s Master and Commander
series might disagree.
223. MATHER, supra note 153, 994–97 (reprinting lists of Suffolk County militia).
224. When the Revenge was originally commissioned in 1777, Joseph Conkling was captain
and Post was first lieutenant, 7 NAVAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 222, at 995–96 (1976)
(reprinting the shipping articles of the Revenge), but by 1779 Post is listed as Captain. 2 PUBLIC
RECORDS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 346 (1895) (reprinting a 1779 record referring to
Post as Captain of the Revenge).
225. 3 TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 348 (1878) (recording his 1796 selection as
trustee).
226. Similarly Nathan’s will designates his “friend Lemuel Pierson” as one of his executors.
Will of Nathan Post (written 1798, probated 1804), in Suffolk County Surrogate’s Court, Liber
B, at 272 (on file with the author). Lemuel was an elder (a lay leader of the Presbyterian
Church) and would hardly have claimed friendship with a man of the character Burroughs
describes. Gravestone transcribed in ADAMS, supra note 12 at 320 (“[Lemuel] was many year an
Elder in the Presbyterian Church in this place & adorned his profession by a life of exemplary
piety.”).
227. Hedges writes of Post:
Engaged in the West India trade, he had been sufficiently successful to own a large
farm, build a capacious dwelling, decorate its walls, wainscot its rooms, and finish his
house in what then was thought a superior style. He owned slaves, and in the kitchen
of the dwelling, he fixed, for their correction, a whipping-post . . . .
Hedges, supra note 15. Adams wrote of the house in 1962 as still being one of the notable homes
of Southampton, although by then it was known as the Sayre House. ADAMS, supra note 12, at
222. Further testament to Nathan’s wealth is that in a time when few individuals left monetary
bequests in their wills (most bequests consisted of furniture, clothing, and livestock, which
Nathan left as well), Nathan left his son Nathan Jr. five hundred pounds, and his daughter Peggy
one hundred pounds, in addition to the rest of his estate which went to Lodowick. Will of
Nathan Post (written 1798, probated 1804), in Suffolk County Surrogate’s Court, Liber B, at 272
(on file with the author).
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228
town, on the triangular commons that formed its hub. His lack of
education is substantiated as well. In the 1777 agreement to
commission the privateer Revenge, Nathan was one of only three in a
229
crew of forty-eight to sign with an X, the sign of illiteracy. There
may also be hints of the desire to appear important that Burroughs
portrays. His gravestone designates him “Esquire,”230 formerly a
designation for a knight or gentleman or landowner, but in the
contemporary documents of the town usually used to indicate that
someone was an attorney. Nathan’s bequest of his “riding chair” to
his wife also evokes images of a country squire elevating his height
and status as he rode about the town.231 It also may suggest desire to
curry favor with the powerful for an uneducated man to so actively
oppose the purchase of history books for the town library.
We can also make some guesses at how Nathan Post and his
wealth would have been perceived in Bridgehampton. The people of
the town were primarily agricultural, and were not, as a rule, given to
displays of wealth. Burroughs wrote of Bridgehampton that

Economy was practiced here, upon the closest system, by far, of any
with which I was ever acquainted. . . . The people were so extremely
attached to their own modes and customs, that it produced a
fondness for their own society and disrelish to other customs,
beyond parallel; hence emigration from their internal population
was less frequent here, than in places elsewhere. Therefore the
country had become populous, and the soil so exhausted, as not to
be luxuriant. The land was generally divided into small parcels
amongst the proprietors, from forty to ten acres. Under these
circumstances, rather than emigrate into those parts where land was
in greater plenty, they contented themselves with living close, poor,
232
and careful . . . .

Yale president Timothy Dwight, who toured Long Island in 1804, also
remarked on the adherence to custom on Eastern Long Island

228. HALSEY, supra note 173, at 200 (map extending from Water Mill to Wainscott from
about the year 1800).
229. See 7 NAVAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 222, at 996 (Jan. 19, 1777 agreement). By 1787
he had learned to sign his name, signing the Woolworth agreement with his own name rather
than the X used by one subscriber, Stephen Stambro. ADAMS, supra note 12, at 191–94
(reprinting the “Wollworth Agreement” of July 2, 1787).
230. Id. at 334.
231. Will of Nathan Post (written 1798, probated 1804), in Suffolk County Surrogate’s
Court, Liber B, at 272 (on file with the author).
232. BURROUGHS, supra note 213, at 42–43.
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generally, the dominance of agriculture in Bridgehampton, as well as
233
the appearance of decline in Southampton. The only wealth Dwight
noted was among those who, like Captain Post, had grown wealthy in
234
commerce and shipping in the wake of the war. Nathan, who
flourished in commerce while his neighbors struggled to farm and
flaunted his wealth while they followed an ethic of thrift, might not
have been widely admired by his neighbors.
Lodowick Post’s fox hunting would not have helped this
235
reputation. Justice Livingston declared the fox “hostem humani
generis,” the enemy of all the world, one whose “depredations on
farmers and on barn yards, have not been forgotten; and to put him to
death wherever found, is allowed to be meritorious, and of public
benefit.”236 There is indeed some evidence that the death of this
“saucy intruder” would have been welcome in the town. First, chicken
keeping was apparently a universal local occupation, inspiring the
following lines by a visiting poetess:
They couldn’t change the subject I’m sure if they were hired,
They talked of hens and chickens till my very soul was tired,
And fed me on young roosters for breakfast, dinner, and tea,
237
Until I dreamed pin feathers sprouted out all over me.

In this chicken keeping community, foxes were a minor menace. On
April 5, 1791, the town agreed on a fee of four shillings to be provided
238
for every fox killed between March 20 and June 20. There is also
evidence that this bounty was enough to induce some to chicanery in
claiming it; the law provided that to claim the reward individuals
[S]hall first carry them before the nearest magistrate being yet green
and unstuffed, and shall satisfy the said magistrate that the said fox
or foxes were taken within the time afore limited, and the said
magistrate shall cut off the tip of the nose of said fox and forward a

233. 3 TIMOTHY DWIGHT, TRAVELS IN NEW ENGLAND AND NEW YORK 219–20, 222–23
(Barbara Miller Solomon ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1969) (1822).
234. Id.
235. For a comprehensive and convincing discussion of the status of fox hunting as a
recreational activity rather than a means of reducing the fox population, see McDowell, supra
note 15.
236. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 180 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (Livingston, J., dissenting).
237. ADAMS, supra note 12, at 160 (reprinting Hannah Elliston, Bridgehampton Chickens).
238. 3 TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 332–33 (1878).
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certificate by the bearer of said fox to the Town Clerk that he is
239
satisfied in respect to the time when the fox was taken.

But Lodowick’s hunt with his horses and hounds might have
been perceived as pretension, even nuisance, instead of community
service. In England, hunting was a flashpoint for struggles over the
use and regulation of land and broader political struggles.240 Hunting
was considered a royal prerogative, and only men of property could
241
legally hunt game such as deer and rabbits. These laws were
explicitly justified by class distinctions. The eighteenth century A New
Abridgement of the Law stated that the common law had not placed
restrictions on who could hunt, but that
as by this toleration [of the common law] persons of quality and
distinction were deprived of their recreations and amusements, and
idle and indigent people, by their loss of time and pains in such
pursuits, were mightily injured, it was thought necessary to make
242
laws for preserving the game from the latter.

Although hunting for vermin like fox was legally open to anyone,243 in
practice preserving the hunt became the concern and occupation of
244
the gentry. The ethos of hunting, moreover, was specifically that it
not be functional; English gentry scorned as “poachers” those who,
regardless of whether they were legally allowed to hunt, hunted to kill
or sell their prey.245
At the time of Lodowick’s hunt, foxhunting was not
instrumental, but was established as a leisure activity of wealthy
246
men. In fact, the goal of the hunt in America was not even

239. Id. at 333–34.
240. As early as 1389, there are reports of illegal hunting parties “under . . . colour” of which
the peasants “make their assemblies, conferences, and consipiracies for to rise and disobuey
their allegiance.” P.B. MUNSCHE, GENTLEMEN AND POACHERS 11 (1981). E.P. Thompson’s
Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act, provides a lovely history of how both illegal
hunting and the suppression of it in the 1720s were the expression of battles between elites over
governmental control and patronage. Thompson, supra note 178.
241. See MUNSCHE, supra note 240, at 8–10.
242. 4 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 5 (Sir Henry Gwillim ed.,
7th ed. 1832) (1736).
243. MUNSCHE, supra note 240, at 3–4.
244. See id. at 143.
245. Id. at 52–54.
246. Caroline Jones, Fox Hunting in America, 24 AM. HERITAGE 62, 65 (Oct. 1973) (“A
pack of hounds became as integral a part of a gentleman’s assets as his ‘horses, slaves and
guns.’”).
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necessarily to kill the fox, as a previously hunted fox might lead a
247
better chase. Fox hunting required substantial investment in the
acquisition and upkeep of foxhounds and horses.248 It was pursued,
moreover, in the English style. An Englishman had introduced the
sport to Long Island in 1768, and imported his dogs, horses, and
huntsmen from England for the purpose.249 There were of course no
property qualifications for the hunt in America, and George
Washington, icon of American democracy, himself was an avid fox
hunter.250 But Washington was a product of the vast plantations of
251
Virginia where fox hunting flourished. In the eastern Long Island
community Dwight and Burroughs described, with its small parcels of
land and traditional, thrifty farmers, fox hunting as Lodowick
practiced it signaled aspiration to a foreign and scorned lifestyle: the
use of the land and its resources for recreation rather than
sustenance.252
Lodowick Post, storming through this land with his company of
men, dogs, and horses, and denying Jesse Pierson the profits of his
quick action, would have inspired an ire similar to that raised by the
English gentry trampling through the common pastures. This
resentment would be doubled by Lodowick’s demand for the profits
of the common land in which the Piersons were fighting to preserve
their special rights.253 To Nathan and Lodowick Post, however, Jesse

247. Id. at 62, 64.
248. Id. at 65–67.
249. Id. at 68.
250. Id. at 67. Washington’s introduction to the sport highlights its elite nature. Lord
Thomas Fairfax, who held grants to the vast swath of land that is now Shenandoah National
Park, introduced Washington to fox hunting when the future president was a land surveyor
helping Fairfax with the legal disputes over the land. Id.; JOSEPH J, ELLIS, HIS EXCELLENCY,
GEORGE WASHINGTON 10 (2004) (discussing the surveying job and the Fairfax land holdings).
Ellis describes the Fairfaxes as one of the two greatest influences on young Washington,
describing them as “a living remnant of European feudalism and English-style aristocracy,
firmly imbedded within Virginia’s more provincial version of country gentlemen. As such, they
were the supreme example of privileged bloodlines, royal patronage, and what one Washington
biographer has called ‘the assiduous courting of the great.’” Id. at 10. Lord Fairfax’s avid
foxhunting was part of this English gentility.
251. Jones, supra note 246, at 66–67.
252. In fact fox hunting was much slower to catch on in New England, whose puritan ethos
was more similar to that of the eastern tip of Long Island, than it was in New York City and the
states further south. Id. at 68.
253. Indeed in England, conflict between the working class that wants to use common access
rights to ramble in the country and the upper class that wants to use them for fox hunting has
continued into the 21st century. See Alan Cowell, Just rambling like a fox; Some private land
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Pierson’s rude violation of the traditions of the hunt would have been
a denial of the status they felt they had earned in the community.
Their anger would also have been compounded by the conflict over
the commons, with Jesse’s refusal to return the fox taken as a
statement that they were not equal members of the town. For both
sides, it would not have been about the fox, but about the distribution
254
of status and resources within the community.
IV. THE FOX IN COURT
It is unlikely that the parties really spent a thousand pounds
prosecuting the case as local lore claimed by 1895.255 But they do seem
256
to have retained the very best of attorneys for their cause. The
Colden listed as Post’s lawyer may have been David Cadwallader
Colden. The grandson of the former lieutenant governor and scholar
Cadwallader Colden, David was appointed the U.S. District Attorney
for New York City in 1798, was also a leading practitioner of
commercial law, and later served as a U.S. Representative and Mayor

open to English walkers, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 20, 2004, at 1 (describing class tensions that
contribute to a modern day dispute between hunters and walkers).
254. E.P. Thompson argues that this kind of conflict was also at the heart of the Black Act,
the infamous 1723 law that created fifty capital offenses associated with poaching game.
THOMPSON, supra note 178, at 21–22 (describing the Black Act). Thompson writes,
What was at issue was not land use but who used the available land: that is, power
and property-right. . . . The forest officialdom, by enlarging and reviving feudal claims
to forest land use—essentially claims for the priority of the deer’s economy over that
of the inhabitants—were using the deer as a screen behind which to advance their
own interests.
Id. at 99.
255. Hedges, supra note 15. The highest annual salary of a schoolteacher, for example, was
only forty pounds, and the average salary was only about eighteen. 5 TOWN RECORDS, supra
note 14, at 126–31 (printing attendance lists and teacher salaries in Southampton in 1796).
Nathan Post’s entire bequest to his second born son in 1798 was only 500 pounds, and to his
daughter 100. Will of Nathan Post (written 1798, probated 1804), in Suffolk County Surrogate’s
Court, Liber B, at 272 (on file with the author). By 1935 another writer had multiplied the figure
to $10,000 each. HALSEY, supra note 173, at 118. In a case that involved no discovery, almost no
documents, and only two arguments, these crippling lawyer fees are probably more the product
of the inflation of the imagination than the truth.
256. In a very interesting recent paper, Angela Fernandez argues that in the New York
Supreme Court the case may have been regarded as a kind of judicial pedagogical exercise, a
chance for Chancellor Kent to run his associate justices (several of them former students),
through their jurisprudential paces. Fernandez, supra note 15. Professor Fernandez suggests that
the preeminence of the lawyers might be explained by the apparent orchestration of a hightoned debate before the court. Id. at 57.
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257
of New York. The Sanford listed as arguing for the Piersons would
almost certainly have been Nathan Sanford, who insisted on the oned spelling that appears in the opinion (most of the family spelled it
258
“Sandford”). Sanford had been born in Bridgehampton, and was
very much the local boy made good. He was the child of uneducated
parents, but with the encouragement of the Piersons was able to
259
attend the prestigious Hayground Academy. He went on to Yale in
1796, earned admission to the New York bar in 1799, and was
appointed U.S. Commissioner of Bankruptcy in 1802 and U.S.
District Attorney for New York by 1803.260
261
Colden would later publish a book on the Steamboat Act, and
262
Sanford was known for his ability with languages. The presence of
two such accomplished attorneys would explain their facility with
classical sources.263 It might also explain the odd fact that the case was
264
first heard by the Justice Court in Queens County although the
incident had occurred in Suffolk County. This may have been a
concession to the Posts’ New York-based and Queens-born attorney,
an effort to avoid any local bias in favor of the Piersons, or even an
attempt to overcome local knowledge that the land was not truly
unpossessed as Post claimed. Whatever the strategy, it worked:
Lodowick won the first round.265

257. 5 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 500 (John A. Garraty & Mark C. Carnes eds.,
1999).
258. Nathan is reputed to have said that he didn’t have time for more than one “d.”
Conversation with Ann Sandford, in Southampton, Long Island, N.Y. (Aug. 16, 2005).
259. Id.
260. 9 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF NOTABLE AMERICANS
(Rossiter Johnson & John Howard Brown eds., 1904) (entry under “Sanford, Nathan”). Sanford
would later become a U.S. Senator and then Chancellor of the State of New York. Id. Not
satisfied with professional success, Sanford married three times. Id. The third time was at the
White House to the daughter of a signer of the Constitution and near relative of John Quincy
Adams. Id. Sanford also built a marble adorned mansion in Flushing, Queens, in which he died
in 1838. Id.
261. DAVID CADWALLADER COLDEN, A VINDICATION OF THE STEAM BOAT RIGHT
GRANTED BY THE STATE OF NEW-YORK IN THE FORM OF AN ANSWER TO THE LETTER OF MR.
DUER (1818).
262. Hedges, supra note 15.
263. Sanford’s retort to Colden’s use of Barbeyrac that “[t]he only authority relied on is that
of an annotator,” Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 176 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805), in particular, shows an
impressive facility with the sources and priority of classical law. Charles Donahue, however,
claims that neither side appropriately interpreted the Roman law. Donahue, supra note 174, at
39–40.
264. Pierson, 3 Cai. at 176.
265. Id.
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The parties probably had little to do with the argument of the
case in the New York Supreme Court. The case was heard in the
August term of the court, and so would have been argued in Albany,
a distance of over two hundred miles and many days from the parties’
homes. Nathan Post, moreover, died in October 1803, two years
before the case was decided. In addition, the jurisdiction of the court
266
at the time, moreover, was strictly limited to questions of law, and
267
the sole source of facts was Post’s original declaration. Finally,
although Pierson had presented six potential grounds for appeal, the
268
New York Supreme Court considered only one. By this time the
case reflected a different agenda, that of one of the nation’s leading
courts working to forge an American legal tradition.269 For the
justices, the apparently meaningless dispute about the fox, combined
with the scholarly arguments of the attorneys, presented an
opportunity to test legal reasoning on a “novel and nice question.”270
The appellate court reversed the lower court’s decision and
awarded the fox to Pierson. In an opinion by Associate Justice Daniel
Tompkins, the court held that possession of a wild animal went to the
one who first captured him. Today, the long quotations in Latin, the
reliance on a sixth century Roman treatise, and the careful discussion
of the medieval and enlightenment commentaries on the treatise, all
smack of a legal system hopelessly caught in the past. At the time,
however, the choice of sources was revolutionary.
First, neither opinion cited Blackstone’s Commentaries on the
Law. This is a surprising omission: Blackstone stated the principle of
possession of wild animals by occupancy,271 had been cited to the
court by the parties,272 and probably provided the attorneys with many
of the citations to the ancient treatises that they relied on. Equally
telling is the majority’s quick conclusion that “[l]ittle satisfactory aid
can, therefore, be derived from the English reporters.”273 Blackstone

266. Butler et al., supra note 3, at 933–34.
267. See Donahue, supra note 174, at 43 & n.15 (noting that procedural rules of time
required that the declaration of the losing party be taken as true).
268. Pierson, 3 Cai. at 180 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
269. For an argument that this judicial agenda was even more pointed, and included an
effort by Chancellor Kent to use the case as a pedagogical exercise, see Fernandez, supra note
15.
270. Id. at 179–80 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
271. BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *391–92, *403.
272. Pierson, 3 Cai. at 176.
273. Id. at 178.
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274
was the dominant legal text of the day, and New York like most of
the colonies had adopted the English common law by statute,
claiming its principles as the privilege of an independent people.275
But at the turn of the century, state courts, with New York often in
the lead, began to reject reliance on English law in favor of principles
designed to serve the new republic.276 Indeed St. George Tucker, in
his introduction to the 1803 edition of Blackstone, attacked the
applicability of English law to the states and used the inapplicability
of English property law as a particular example.277 In declining to
discuss the English authorities, and relying on ancient Roman law on
the one hand and Enlightenment era philosophers on the other, the
court at once rejected England as the source of all legal rules and tied
278
American law to the universal principles these sources implied.
Judges at this time were not only rejecting English law as a core
source of authority, but were also beginning to see themselves as
makers of the law, deciding cases based on policy as well as
279
precedent. Pierson v. Post reflects this trend. In writing the majority
opinion, Justice Tompkins is not content to rely unquestioningly on
the Roman sources, but also affirms their wisdom as a matter of

274. ALEXANDER, supra note 26, at 47.
275. MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780–1860, at 4–6
(1977). The perceived “privilege” of the common law stemmed in part from Calvin’s Case, an
English case stating that infidels in a conquered country were not subject to English law until it
was adopted by positive enactment, while English citizens carried their own law with them. Id.
at 17. In receiving the common law, the colonies declared themselves independent, with all the
rights of Englishmen, and not a conquered people. Id.
276. Id. at 20–27.
277. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, at iii–iv (Rothman reprint
1969) (1803). Although Tucker admitted that before the Commentaries students of law “were
almost destitute of any scientific guide to conduct their studies,” since its publication, “the
student who had read the COMMENTARIES three or four times over, was lead to believe that
he was a thorough proficient in the law, without further labour, or assistance,” a phenomenon
with “effects almost as pernicious” as the former. Id. The American Revolution, he wrote, had
“produced a corresponding revolution not only in the principles of our government, but in the
laws which relate to property, and in a variety of other cases, equally contradictory to the law,
and irreconcilable to the principles contained in the Commentaries.” Id. at iv–v; see also
HORWITZ, supra note 275, at 11 (discussing the Tucker edition).
278. In searching for an identity separate from their largely English roots, the founders
likened their society to the ancient democracies of Rome and Greece, learning from their
wisdom and mistakes. See WOOD, supra note 46, at 5–8, 50 (discussing the colonists’ attempt to
decipher the political philosophy of the age through pamphlets, letters, articles, and sermons);
see also Donahue, supra note 174, at 40 (stating that the use of roman law was “not so odd as it
would have been 30 years before or 30 years after. The Founding Fathers were Romanophiles”).
279. See HORWITZ, supra note 275, at 22–23.
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policy. If property rights are to be acquired simply by pursuit without
physical possession, he claims, more than one individual could claim
to have pursued the property and arguments would arise about who
pursued it first. “[P]reserving peace and order in society” requires a
rule that will provide “certainty,” and thereby avoid “this fertile
source of quarrels and litigation.”280
Justice Livingston in dissent takes the instrumental trend even
further, scornfully rejecting reliance on scholarly authority. He
asserted that the dispute “should have been submitted to the
arbitration of sportsmen,” which would have quickly disposed of it,
“interfering with no usage or custom which the experience of ages has
sanctioned.”281 This claim reflects the growing opinion that the
common law reflected neither natural law nor the wisdom of the ages;
justice, rather, was to be found in the customs of the people.282 Justice
Livingston further argues that that no one would put in the
investment necessary to catch the fox if “a saucy intruder, who had
not shared in the honours or labours of the chase, were permitted to
come in at the death, and bear away in triumph the object of
pursuit.”283 This line of reasoning is even more in line with the trend
of the times. It shows not only an understanding of judges as
lawmakers, but also the growing belief that that law should be made
so as to facilitate economic development.284
Thus far, the opinions accord well with the American conceit of
property law. Both in land and in commerce, the new nation offered
ample unpossessed resources for individuals to claim and use. The
only question was what rule would be chosen as the means for

280. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 179 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). The very fact that the case made it
to the court undermines this argument, suggesting either the lack of awareness or the lack of
satisfaction with the rule as being sufficient to preserve the peace. But this argument echoes one
made by Blackstone himself as a justification for permanent property by occupancy,
BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *3–4, again suggesting consultation, if not citation of
Blackstone.
281. Pierson, 3 Cai. at 180 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
282. See HORWITZ, supra note 275, at 19–21.
283. Pierson, 3 Cai. at 180–81 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
284. That same year, Livingston would exemplify this trend in his opinion in Palmer v.
Mulligan, 3 Cai. 308 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). In his concurrence in Palmer, Livingston stated that
the English common law principle that individuals must use their property so as not to interfere
with the prior use by others of their property, must be limited to cases of very serious harm,
because otherwise “the public, whose advantage is always to be regarded, would be deprived of
the benefit which always attends competition and rivalry.” 3 Cai. at 314 (Livingston, J.,
concurring).
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possessing those resources, balancing the advantages of certainty,
industry custom, and reward for labor. But look into the biographies
of the justices, and we might question the neutrality with which they
weighed these factors.
Neither broad political affiliations nor professional status divided
the justices. Both Daniel Tompkins and Henry Brockholst Livingston
were at the very top of the nation’s legal and political elite. Tompkins
had graduated first in his class at Columbia, served as a delegate to
the state’s constitutional convention in 1801, was appointed Associate
Justice of the New York Supreme Court in 1804 when he was just 30,
served as governor of New York between 1807 and 1817, and as Vice
285
President of the United States from 1817 to 1825. Livingston was
the son of the Governor of New Jersey, had been elected to the state
assembly in 1786, and was appointed to the United States Supreme
Court in 1806.286 Both were also leaders of the antifederalist
movement that backed Jefferson in his bitter and successful fight for
the presidency in 1800.287
But the two came from very different communities. Livingston’s
family was one of the two largest landholders in the state.288 Under a
Royal British patent, the Livingstons owned half of a million acres in
upstate New York, which they rented to thousands of tenant farmers
in an American version of English manorial society.289 This quasifeudal structure would not fall apart until the Anti-Rent Wars of the
1840s, but the democratic rhetoric of the American Revolution and
economic stress in the wake of the war were already placing stress on
290
the system. Tompkins’ parents, on the other hand, had been among
the tenant farmers occupying one of these great manorial estates.291
Although they had moved to Scarsdale before Tompkins’ birth,292 this
background clearly influenced his politics. As a young man organizing
voters for the Tammany party, Tompkins encouraged the poor to
pool their resources to buy property so that they could qualify as

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

21 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 257, at 738–39.
13 id. at 764–65.
Id. at 765; 21 id. at 738.
REEVE HUSTON, LAND AND FREEDOM 15 (2000).
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 5, 33.
RAY W. IRWIN, DANIEL D. TOMPKINS: GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK AND VICE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 1–2 (1968).
292. Id. at 3–4.
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293
freeholders and vote. Two years after Pierson v. Post was decided,
he was elected governor after running a campaign as a “humble farm
boy,” in which he declared, “[t]here’s not a drop of aristocratical or
294
oligarchial blood in my veins.”
For Livingston, Jesse Pierson’s seizure of the object of the hunt
would have invaded the prerogatives of the “gentleman” and violated
the norms which the “experience of the ages has sanctioned” by
according the reward to one who had not shared in the “honours” of
295
the chase. He betrays this aristocratic sensibility by advocating the
position of Barbeyrac, who distinguished between one who pursued
“with large dogs and hounds,” to whom the fox should be accorded,
and one who pursued “with beagles only,” against whom the chance
captor would have superior rights.296 Livingston thought that because
in this case the fox was pursued by “hounds of imperial stature,” Post
297
should have triumphed.
Tompkins less clearly betrays class bias in his opinion, unless it is
his impatience with the argument that the “uncourteous” nature of
298
Pierson’s behavior is relevant to his legal rights. But it is easy to
imagine Tompkins seeing Pierson as a “humble farm boy” like
himself, braving the displeasure of the local lord by disregarding the
norms of the leisure pursuits of the gentleman. The one that actually
got the job done, not the one with historical or custom-based claims
to priority, should succeed.
Knowledge of the real community conflict within Southampton
might have affected or even reversed Tompkins’ and Livingston’s
positions on the dispute. While Jesse Pierson was a schoolteacher
299
rather than a manor holder, his family had historic claims to the
commons similar to those the Livingstons sought to defend against
the more recent immigrants who desired the land. Similarly, Nathan
and Lodowick Post’s claim was not based on historic patents, but on
the rights of those who had invested and succeeded in the same way

293. Id. at 44; Junto Society, United States Vice Presidents, http://www.juntosociety.com/vp/
thomkins.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2006).
294. United States Vice Presidents, supra note 293 (internal quotation marks omitted).
295. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 180–81 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (Livingston, J., dissenting).
296. Id. at 182.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 179.
299. Compare supra note 176 and accompanying text (noting that Jesse Pierson was on his
way home from teaching at the time of the incident), with 13 AMERICAN NATIONAL
BIOGRAPHY, supra note 257, at 764–65.
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that Tompkins’ family had invested their labor in land owned by
300
another and benefited from the mobility of early American society.
I do not mean to reduce judicial decisionmaking to mere
personal politics. Both justices were committed to forging a law that
would contribute to the economic development of the new nation,
and to an economic philosophy that encouraged quick and sure
appropriation and use of the country’s resources. For the justices, the
community the fox ran through may have been less important than
that the fox was caught, skinned, and sold to the highest bidder. But
each justice’s sense of the propriety of the parties’ means of catching
it may have been influenced, however unconsciously, by the
communities with which each identified.
CONCLUSION: W(H)ITHER PIERSON V. POST?
From our vantage point two hundred years later it appears that
the Piersons may have won the battle but the Posts have won the war.
A world in which Manolo Blahnik stilettos and cashmere wraps are
the appropriate attire for a weekend in the Hamptons is closer to the
tastes of Nathan and Lodowick Post than those of David and Jesse
Pierson. It is true that outside its upscale clubs, the Hamptons retain
traces of the Piersons’ world. Peter’s Pond, where Jesse caught the
fox, may even be one such trace. Although it is no longer a public
commons (“no trespassing” signs mark the way there), it is only
accessible down a dirt and sand road flanked by a cornfield.301 But in
much of Southampton, the principle of opening property to individual
appropriation by all has contributed to a world in which most are
excluded from appropriating any property. The average price of a
house in the Hamptons was about $1.3 million in 2005;302 the
303
Shinnecocks fight for a share of land on which to sustain their tribe;

300. Id.
301. The houses bordering the road are mostly attractive but not opulent, and a couple of
them would not look out of place next to a trailer park. These, however, have Mercedes and
BMWs parked outside, suggesting that they are in fact high priced rentals for wealthy outsiders
willing to stay anywhere to be near the beach.
302. Michael F. Daly, The State of the Hamptons Real Estate—Spring 2006 (Mar. 27, 2006),
http://www.hamptonsview.com/detail.ihtml?id=771&apid=1415&sid=26&cid=31&hm=0&iv=0.
303. See New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 400 F. Supp. 2d 486, 488 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(describing a conflict between the state and the tribe regarding the status of land owned by the
tribe).
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and Latin American immigrants live dozens to a house for the
304
privilege of waiting on street corners for work.
None of this was decided by who got the fox. As I have
suggested, the legal and rhetorical stress on limitless individual
acquisition of property owes much to the American ideals of
democracy and equality. The claims of both the Piersons and the
Posts to the fox were rooted in assertions of equal opportunity,
whether those claims are understood as the court did or understood
in the context of the community struggle that animated the dispute.
And proprietors like the Piersons were no better at preserving
common rights to land than the nonproprietors, using their ownership
rights to push the Shinnecocks off all but a tiny corner of their land
and sell the remaining common lands to the highest bidder. Both
sides in the case actively pursued a conception of property law in
which individual ownership is all, and common shared resources are
but a transitional stage.
The fight over the fox, as imagined and resolved by the
nineteenth century judges and the twentieth century law students that
debate their opinions, has been part of this dominant conception of
property law. In the myth of Pierson, we have the fictional world of
nonownership, in which all that remains is the philosophical question
of how that nonownership becomes individual ownership. In the
untold history of Pierson we have many layers of communities
claiming ownership. In that world, the questions become which group
can decide how the property is to be used, and which community will
survive. These questions lie close beneath the surface of many
305
disputes phrased as ones of individual ownership. Property scholars,
304. See Robert D. McFadden, At Rally, Suffolk Residents Protest Illegal Immigration, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 15, 2000, § 1, at 42 (discussing the local animosity toward the immigrant
population).
305. This is particularly clear in disputes regarding Native American property rights. See,
e.g., Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2004) (involving conflict between a tribe
trying to reclaim historic reservation and a non-Indian municipality seeking to collect tax
revenue); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Assoc., 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (holding that the
United States could build a road and harvest the timber on land central to the religious
ceremonies of three tribes); United States ex rel. Zuni Tribe v. Platt, 730 F. Supp. 318 (D.N.M.
1990) (granting the Zuni tribe a prescriptive easement for religious pilgrimage over a nonIndian’s land). With slight prodding, many other cases can be conceptualized in this manner. See
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (involving developers versus South Carolina
coastal dwellers); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (involving beachfront
property owners versus the beach-going public); Elliff v. Texon Oil Corp., 210 S.W.2d 558 (Tex.
1948) (involving the ranching community versus oil developers); Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng.
Rep. 1223 (Exch. 1843) (involving established mill owners versus enterprising coal miners). And

01__BERGER.DOC

1142

10/13/2006 8:47 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:1089

moreover, increasingly recognize the importance of time, community,
306
and shared rights in property disputes. The property casebooks
reflect this shift as well, displacing Pierson in favor of cases about the
conflict between migrant itinerant farm workers and farm owners,
and disputes regarding American Indian property and sovereignty
rights.307
Should Pierson, then, be excluded from the pedagogical
pantheon? I would hate to see it happen. Where else can you find a
justice writing “de mortuis nil nisi bonum,” (speak no ill of the dead)
of a fox,308 or, more seriously, find a case that presents so succinctly
the opposing arguments one can make in justifying rules for the
309
acquisition of property?
More important, the case has not captured the legal imagination
for so long because of some kind of conspiracy of legal scholars, but
rather because it ties so well into a particular intuitive sense of
property we have in the United States. The dominant rhetoric of
property is that the important question is which individual owns the
310
property, and that this ownership decides all future questions. The
flawed presentation and reception of Pierson v. Post is simply a
product, not the cause, and excising the case will not alter the
perceptions that produced it. The point then is not to ignore that
intuitive sense of property, but to recognize and grapple with it.
Pierson v. Post, supplemented by its history, can aid in this
process by helping future lawyers perceive both the common
understanding of property rules and its limitations. Complemented by
its history, this is what Pierson teaches. First, there rarely is property
without ownership claims, be it Locke’s America, or Pierson’s
“unpossessed and waste land.” Rather, each resource is almost always
subject to overlapping claims, whether those claims are based on

of course the recent case of Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005), places the
question of whether the interests of the established and functioning Fort Trumbull community
could be demolished for the sake of the larger, but depressed, New London community.
306. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
307. See supra note 23.
308. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 180 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (Livingston, J., dissenting).
309. For an excellent summary of the competing theories one could argue in claiming the
fox, see Jeremy Paul, The Politics of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1779, 1795–96 (1991).
310. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 19, at 283 (“Most people, including most specialists in
their unprofessional moments, conceive of property as things that are owned by persons. To
own property is to have exclusive control of something—to be able to use it as one wishes, to
sell it, give it away, leave it idle, or destroy it.”).
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time, labor, purchase, or residence. Second, these claims are often as
much claims of communities as they are of individuals. They are
contests over the right to define the communal way of life, not simply
absolute control over a thing. Their resolution thus decides not only
which individual can claim property, but also which community will
be chosen, and what it will mean. Ultimately, the story of Pierson v.
Post helps to reveal the mesh through which other property disputes
are filtered and misrepresented, the shared patterns of omission
created by our intuitive but incomplete understanding of property.
Understanding this is an important step in creating a new lens—one
that is better equipped to serve our common interests.

